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Abstract: Programs linking substantial amounts of college aid to academic achievement could 
work either by lowering the cost of college or by inducing additional student effort. I examine the 
PROMISE program in West Virginia, which offers free tuition to students who maintain a 
minimum GPA and course load. Using administrative data, I exploit discontinuities in the 
eligibility formula and the timing of implementation to estimate causal effects. I find robust and 
significant impacts on key academic outcomes. Impacts are concentrated around the annual 
requirements for scholarship renewal, suggesting that the program works via incentives for 
academic achievement, not simply by relaxing financial constraints. 
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I. Introduction 
 The United States has long ranked as the most educated nation in the world, but this 
status is beginning to slip.  While bachelor’s degree attainment rates have risen substantially in 
other countries over the past three decades, they have barely budged in the U.S. 1  Those who do 
earn degrees are taking longer to do so (Turner 2004; Bound, Lovenheim and Turner 2007).   
National figures also mask considerable variation in attainment at the state level.  Statistics from 
the 2000 census show that only 16 percent of those born in the lowest-ranked state of West 
Virginia (age 25 and older) had attained a bachelor’s degree—well below the national rate of 24 
percent, and comparable to the U.S. average from the late 1970s.    
It is not entirely obvious, however, which policy options are most likely to increase 
college attainment.  Although much research and policy has focused on increasing college 
enrollments (see Dynarski 2002 for a review of this literature), entry alone is no guarantee of 
success.  Only 36 percent of college entrants complete a bachelor’s degree within six years and a 
mere 18 percent complete within four years.2  There is no consensus on why so many entrants 
fail to complete a degree, or fail to complete on time, but policy debates have often focused on 
concerns either about students’ financial constraints or their academic preparation/motivation.   
These joint concerns may explain the increasing popularity of programs offering large 
financial incentives for college achievement.3  These programs simultaneously reduce the cost of 
                                                 
1 According to the OECD’s “Education at a Glance 2007,” the United States was tied with Norway for the highest 
proportion of 25-64 year olds with a Bachelor’s degree or higher (30 percent, see Table A.1.3a); however, among 
25-34 year olds, the U.S. has fallen to sixth place, behind Norway, the Netherlands, Iceland, Korea, and Denmark.   
2 Author’s calculations using data from NCES’s Beginning Postsecondary Students (BPS) longitudinal study, 1996-
2001, based on all degree-seeking students entering 2- and 4-year colleges.  Among only those entering 4-year 
colleges, the corresponding rates are 67 percent and 36 percent, respectively. 
3 Although this paper focuses on incentives at the college level, several studies have examined educational incentive 
programs targeted at younger students (see, e.g., Roland Fryer’s ongoing experiments with incentives for elementary 
school students in New York City and other U.S. cities [www.edlabs.harvard.edu]; Angrist and Lavy [forthcoming] 
examine incentives for high school achievement in Israel; Bettinger [2008] examines incentives for passing 
standardized tests as early as third grade in Ohio; Jackson [2008] examines incentives for A.P. testing in Texas; 
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college, and provide clear inducements for student effort.  At least fourteen states have 
introduced large-scale merit-based college scholarship programs since 1991, requiring students 
to meet academic criteria both in order to initially qualify and to renew the awards each year.4  
West Virginia joined this group in 2002 with the inauguration of the PROMISE scholarship, 
which provided free tuition and fees at any state public institution for qualified students, but only 
as long as they maintained a miminum GPA and course load during college.  
Large merit-based scholarships such as West Virginia’s PROMISE may affect outcomes 
among eligible college enrollees via two mechanisms: cost-of-college effects and incentive 
effects.  The PROMISE scholarship is a high-value award, worth an average of approximately 
$10,000 over four years for those who initially qualify.5  Even without any academic incentives, 
it might still enable some financially constrained students to enroll full-time rather than part-
time, or to attend for more semesters than they would have otherwise.6  Lowering the cost of 
college might also reduce student employment, thus enabling students to spend more time on 
their coursework, raise their GPAs and accelerate their progress towards a degree.7  Even among 
the financially unconstrained, PROMISE generates direct incentives to increase academic effort 
by establishing annual achievement requirements for renewal.  Why might such external 
motivation be needed?  State-subsidized tuition and parent support mean that few students pay 
                                                                                                                                                             
Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton [forthcoming] examine incentives for high test scores for adolescent girls in Kenya; 
Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd [2005] and Schultz [2004] examine the PROGRESA program in Mexico).  See 
Angrist and Lavy (forthcoming) for a review of the literature on incentives for younger students. 
4 This includes Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Florida, West Virginia, and Oklahoma, although Arkansas and Maryland have since phased out 
their programs.  Of these, West Virginia has among the most stringent requirements for scholarship renewal. 
5 This figure is based on the first two PROMISE cohorts.  The value has increased as college tuition has risen. 
6 Cost-of-college effects will be strongest when students are constrained in their ability (or willingness) to borrow, 
but may affect even unconstrained individuals via standard income and substitution effects.  Note, however, that 
even this scholarship is relatively small in comparison to lifetime income or the cost of attendance including 
foregone wages. 
7 Simulations by Keane and Wolpin (2001) suggest that credit constraints primarily affect student employment 
rather than college enrollment decisions.   
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the full cost of an additional year of schooling.  PROMISE may help resolve this principal-agent 
problem by aligning students’ incentives with their funders’ preferences.  
Although previous research shows that merit-based aid, like traditional financial aid, can 
increase college enrollments (Kane 2003; Dynarski 2004; Cornwell, Mustard and Sridhar 2006), 
the scant evidence on outcomes beyond initial enrollment has been mixed.  Dynarski (2008) 
estimates that large-scale merit-aid programs in Arkansas and Georgia reduced the college 
dropout rate by 3 to 5 percentage points.8  But if Georgia’s program increased persistence, it may 
also have lengthened time-to-degree: Cornwell, Lee, and Mustard (2005) find that the Georgia 
HOPE scholarship reduced the fraction of freshmen at the University of Georgia completing a 
full course load by 6 percentage points.  One recent experiment with merit-based scholarships 
(up to $2,000) for low-income community college students finds positive and significant effects 
on full-time enrollment and credit accumulation over the first three semesters (Brock and 
Richburg-Hayes 2006); but another recent experiment offering even larger merit-based awards 
(up to $5,000) at a large public Canadian university found essentially no effects over the first two 
years (Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos 2009).9  Importantly, no previous study has attempted to 
disentangle the mechanisms underlying observed effects. 
This paper contributes to the literature by examining the effects of a large financial 
incentive program, West Virginia’s PROMISE scholarship, on post-enrollment outcomes from 
semester-level GPAs and credits accumulated to degree completion five years later.  I utilize two 
complementary quasi-experimental approaches to identify causal effects.  The first is a 
                                                 
8 Dynarski’s main finding is a three percentage point increase in the overall proportion of the population with a 
college degree, resulting from both higher college enrollments and a higher completion rate among enrollees.  She 
bounds the effect on dropout rates by assuming that all or none of the individuals induced to enter college by the 
program complete a degree. 
9 Although Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos (2009) find no effects overall for students who were offered just the 
financial incentive, they do find positive effects for women who were offered extra student services in addition to 
the financial incentive. 
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regression-discontinuity (RD) analysis based on the college entrance test score cutoff for initial 
PROMISE eligibility.  The second approach is a cohort analysis based on the discontinuous 
timing of program implementation.  The primary threat to identification under either approach is 
differential selection into the West Virginia college system.  In addition to controlling for an 
extremely rich set of covariates, I address this concern directly using a bounding exercise in the 
spirit of Lee bounds (2009).   
To preview the results, I find significant positive effects on a range of outcomes. The RD 
and the cohort analysis generate broadly similar results, and the bounding exercise shows that the 
impacts are too large to be explained by differential selection.  I find compelling evidence that 
cost-of-college effects alone cannot explain the results.  Impacts are strongly concentrated 
around the specific annual achievement thresholds for PROMISE renewal, particularly the 
course load requirements. For example, at the end of the freshman year, PROMISE recipients 
were nearly 25 percentage points more likely to have earned 30 or more credits, the threshold for 
PROMISE renewal.  Tellingly, the annual impacts are roughly constant in the freshman through 
junior years, but virtually disappear in the fourth year while students are still receiving 
PROMISE funds but no longer have the opportunity to renew.   I conclude that a traditional grant  
with no strings attached would not produce the same pattern of effects. 
Section II describes the PROMISE scholarship and the dataset in detail.  Section III 
presents the empirical strategy and main results, including a bounding of the bias due to 
selection.  Section IV investigates whether PROMISE works primarily by reducing the cost of 
college or by providing specific incentives for achievement.  Section V discusses the results and 
implications for future research.   
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II. West Virginia’s PROMISE Scholarship  
In 2002, West Virginia began offering PROMISE (Providing Real Opportunities to 
Maximize In-state Student Excellence) scholarships to promote academic achievement and 
encourage qualified students to stay in the state for college and, hopefully, beyond.  The 
PROMISE scholarship covers full tuition and required fees for up to four years for eligible first-
time freshmen who enroll full-time at a West Virginia public two- or four-year institution, or an 
“equivalent amount” at an eligible West Virginia private institution.10  Full-time enrollment is 
defined as a minimum of 12 credit-hours per semester.11   
 Eligibility for the scholarship is based entirely on a student’s academic record, not 
financial need.  Incoming freshmen must have a 3.0 high school grade point average (GPA) both 
overall and within a set of “core courses.”  They must also have scored at least a 21 overall on 
the ACT or 1000 on the SAT.12  West Virginia estimates that approximately 23 percent of their 
high school graduates (or about 40 percent of their in-state first-time freshmen) meet the initial 
eligibility requirements.13  Thus, PROMISE recipients are not the academic elite, but neither are 
they average students.  To renew the scholarship, undergraduates must successfully complete at 
least 30 credits per year and maintain a 3.0 cumulative GPA, although they are allowed a 2.75 
GPA in their first year.  Those who fail to meet renewal requirements once cannot later regain 
the scholarship.  In the first two PROMISE cohorts, approximately 75 percent renewed the 
scholarship for a second year and approximately 50 percent retained the scholarship for four 
                                                 
10 This paper focuses on the first two cohorts of PROMISE recipients.  Eligibility rules have changed several times 
since then, and in early 2009, awards were limited to a fixed dollar amount that may not cover full tuition. 
11 Credit hours are roughly intended to correspond to the number of hours of class time per week.  Regular courses 
are typically worth 3-4 credits per semester, although some courses may be worth more or less than that.  
12 Composite ACT scores are calculated by averaging its four subject test sub-scores and rounding to the nearest 
whole number, so PROMISE’s stated threshold of 21 translates into a true threshold of 20.50 along the underlying 
ACT scale. 
13 Phone conversation with Jack Toney, Director of State Financial Aid Programs, April 17, 2008 and author’s 
calculations based on WV college entrants age 19 or younger. 
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years.  The average value of the award in 2002-03 was $2,900 for the first year.  Those who 
initially qualified received an average of about $10,000 in PROMISE funds over four years.14 
(See Appendix A for additional program details, including recent rule changes.)  
The West Virginia Higher Education Policy Commission Data.  The West Virginia 
Higher Education Policy Commission (WVHEPC) is a state agency that maintains a 
comprehensive database on the state’s public college enrollees, and provided me de-identified 
data on four cohorts of new entrants under a restricted-use data agreement (2000-01 through 
2003-04).  The data include limited background information such as age, race, gender, overall 
high school GPA, and ACT and SAT scores if applicable. 15  No direct measure of family income 
or wealth is available for the full sample.  The data include complete college transcripts and 
financial aid records for five years after initial enrollment. A unique feature of the data is that 
they also include administrative records of quarterly employment and earnings for students who 
worked in-state, acquired by WVHEPC from the state’s Employment Security agency. 16   
 
III. Impacts on College Persistence, Performance and Completion 
 I utilize two complementary quasi-experimental strategies to identify causal effects: the 
first is a regression-discontinuity (RD) that estimates the effect of being just above rather than 
just below the test score threshold for initial eligibility; and the second approach is a cohort 
                                                 
14 This average includes students who failed to renew the scholarship for all four years. 
15 Over 90 percent of students took the ACT and approximately 15 percent took the SAT.  For those that took both 
exams, the higher score is used to determine eligibility. SAT scores are converted to ACT scores using a national 
concordance table: http://www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/highered/ra/sat/satACT_concordance.pdf.  
Approximately ½ of 1 percent of the RD sample (34 students) scored 980 or 990 on the SAT, which is below the 
threshold for PROMISE but converts to an ACT of 21 (which would meet the PROMISE threshold).  These students 
are assigned an ACT-equivalent of 20. 
16 In theory, the limitation to West Virginia employment is non-trivial given that West Virginia’s two largest 
universities are located within a few miles of state borders.  In practice, these earnings data appear quite comparable 
to students’ self-reports on the FAFSA, which include earnings from any state (see Appendix A for additional 
details). 
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analysis based on the discontinuous timing of program implementation.  The two approaches are 
much stronger together than either would be alone.  The advantage of the RD is that it tightly 
links any observed impacts to an arbitrary program rule, eliminating several alternative 
explanations for the findings.  Neither institutional policies, labor market conditions, nor 
students’ background characteristics should vary discontinuously around the ACT threshold.  
The major limitations of the RD are that it estimates impacts only for those near the eligibility 
threshold, who represent only about 20 percent of all PROMISE recipients and who may differ 
from other students in their response to the program; also, because the threshold was known, the 
RD may be sensitive to differential selection around the cutoff.    
The advantage of the cohort analysis, which compares similar students just before and 
after the implementation of PROMISE, is that it estimates the average treatment effects across all 
recipients, not just those near the threshold.  These results may be less sensitive to selection 
concerns (discussed below), and if credible, are more useful than the RD findings.  The 
drawback of this approach is that I have data for only two cohorts before and two cohorts after 
PROMISE.  Without the RD, one might wonder whether any differences are truly attributable to 
the program, rather than to pre-existing trends, idiosyncratic variation in labor market conditions 
or institutional policies that just happened to coincide with PROMISE implementation.   
Selection bias is the primary threat to validity in either approach.  The analysis focuses on 
college enrollees, but the program may influence who becomes an eligible enrollee in the first 
place.  Indeed, encouraging more students to meet eligibility thresholds and attend college in-
state were explicit goals of the program.  Selection bias could arise from three sources: 1) 
individuals who otherwise would have attended college out-of-state could choose to enroll in-
state, 2) individuals who otherwise would not have enrolled in college could choose to do so, and 
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3) individuals who would have enrolled in college but failed to meet the eligibility criteria could 
work harder in order to reach them.17  Only the first factor is likely to induce a positive bias in 
both the RD and cohort analysis; the second factor is likely to negatively bias both analyses, 
while the third is likely to negatively bias the cohort analysis but could cause a positive bias in 
the RD.18    
I address these concerns explicitly with a bounding exercise, in the spirit of Lee (2009), 
after presenting the main results.  For the moment, I simply note that all specifications control for 
two of the best predictors of college success—high school GPA and ACT score—as well as 
gender, race/ethnicity, and age at entry.  Differential selection is only a concern to the extent it 
occurs on other unmeasured dimensions.  Moreover, as explained above, the net effect of these 
compositional changes is a priori unclear.  
Identification Based on Regression Discontinuity (RD) around the ACT Eligibility Threshold 
 For this analysis, I limit the sample to West Virginia residents entering in the first two 
years after PROMISE implementation who earned at least a 3.0 high school GPA.19  For these 
students PROMISE receipt is strongly determined by ACT score (or SAT equivalent): the vast 
majority of those who score a 20.50 have access to the program while those who score only 
                                                 
17 A particular concern is that students may retake the ACT until they achieve the required score.  On average, about 
36 percent of ACT test-takers repeat the test at least once (Andrews and Ziomek 1998), unfortunately I was not able 
to obtain data on repeat test taking by state over time. Vigdor and Clotfelter (2003) find that the prevalence of 
retesting (at least with respect to the SAT at three selective college) places low-income and African-American 
students at a disadvantage because these groups are less likely to retest, all else equal. 
18 Note that if the best-achieving students just below the ACT threshold exert additional effort to become the lowest-
achieving students just above the threshold, mean outcome levels on both side of the threshold would fall. The 
direction of bias resulting from such a shift could be positive in the RD, but is not necessarily so. 
19 In theory, one could also use the GPA cutoff for an RD analysis.  In practice, however, the GPA requirement was 
rarely decisive.  Among those meeting the GPA requirement, just scaling the ACT threshold increases PROMISE 
receipt by about 70 percentage points; but among those meeting the ACT requirement, just scaling the GPA 
threshold increases PROMISE receipt by only 13 to 25 percentage points, depending on bandwidth.  This is likely 
because students near the GPA threshold are at much higher risk of being disqualified based on their “core course 
GPA,” which is unobservable to me. 
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20.49 do not.20  Except for PROMISE, students scoring just above 20.5 should not systematically 
differ from those scoring just below.  If this assumption holds, then one can examine outcomes 
by ACT score and attribute any discontinuous jumps at the threshold to the effects of PROMISE.   
Graphical analysis. Figure 1 confirms that PROMISE receipt increases sharply for those 
just above the test score threshold.  Nonetheless, about 7 percent of those just below the 
eligibility threshold received PROMISE, and about 23 percent of those just above the threshold 
did not.  My preferred regressions will follow a “fuzzy” RD approach to adjust for the 
discrepancy between apparent eligibility and actual PROMISE receipt, and the causes and 
implications of this discrepancy will be discussed below. 
Figures 2 and 3 plot the raw means of end-of-college outcomes by ACT score, along with 
linear predictions.  Figure 2 shows no discontinuities in the number of semesters of enrollment 
over four years (a measure of persistence) or in typical weekly school-year earnings, but 
indicates perceptible-if-modest discontinuities in total credits and cumulative GPA at the end of 
four years.21  The four panels of Figure 3 show clear and substantively important discontinuities 
in the percent of students meeting key credit and GPA thresholds after four years as well as in 
four- and five-year BA completion rates.   
Estimation.  Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), I use a local linear regression 
specification: 
(1) iiiiiiii XaboveACTdistbelowACTdistabovey εδπςβα +++++= )*()*()(  
                                                 
20 Composite ACT scores are calculated by averaging its four subject test sub-scores and rounding to the nearest 
whole number. 
21 Typical weekly school-year earnings are based on the largest subset of data available for the full sample, including 
the sophomore spring semester (January-March), junior fall and spring semesters (October-March) and senior year 
fall semester (October-December). All earnings data are inflated to 2007 dollars.  For the cumulative GPA measure, 
students who were not enrolled at the end of four years are assigned the cumulative GPA as of last enrollment. 
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where abovei is an indicator that the student is above the threshold, belowi is an indicator that the 
student is below the threshold, ACTdisti is the distance between the student’s individual score 
and the underlying cutoff score (20.5), Xi is a vector of covariates including gender, 
race/ethnicity, age, high school GPA and high school GPA squared, and iε  is an idiosyncratic 
error term.22  The parameter β estimates the difference in outcomes at the threshold.  Intuitively, 
the equation above approximates the prediction lines shown in Figures 2 and 3, except that the 
estimates are adjusted for small differences in covariates.   
Equation (1) provides “sharp” RD estimates of the effect of crossing the ACT threshold, 
not the effect of receiving PROMISE.  To estimate the effect of actually receiving PROMISE, a 
“fuzzy” RD is required.  I implement this using an instrumental variables (IV) regression in 
which I first predict PROMISE receipt using the test score discontinuity, and then estimate the 
effect of predicted receipt on a given outcome.  I again use a local linear specification: 
(2a) iiiiiiii XaboveACTdistbelowACTdistaboveP εφϕγψλ +++++= )*()*()(   
(2b) iiiiiiii XaboveACTdistbelowACTdistPy εδπςβα +++++= )*()*()ˆ(  
where Pi represents actual PROMISE receipt, iP̂  represents predicted PROMISE receipt, and all 
other variables are as defined in equation (1).  Intuitively, this scales up the sharp RD estimates 
by a factor of 1.43 (or 1.00/0.70) to account for the fact that crossing the ACT threshold only 
increases PROMISE receipt by 70 percentage points.   
In other contexts, sharp RD results can be interpreted as intent-to-treat (ITT) effects—
bottom-line estimates of the effect of offering someone the treatment, whether or not they take it 
up—while the fuzzy RD gives the effects of actual treatment on the treated (TOT).  But in this 
                                                 
22 Lee and Card (2008) suggest clustering standard errors by values of the forcing variable (ACT score, in this case) 
when the forcing variable is discrete rather than continuous.  In this case, clustering by ACT score substantially 
reduces the standard errors (see Appendix B, Table. B.1), hence I rely on the more conservative unclustered 
standard errors.   
   11
case the sharp RD results may not be interpretable as ITT effects, depending upon what drives 
the discrepancy between apparent program eligibility and actual receipt.  If take-up among the 
truly eligible is perfect (i.e. the discrepancy is driven entirely by misclassification of eligibility 
status), then the fuzzy RD can be interpreted as providing ITT estimates which simply have been 
corrected for misclassification bias, and the sharp RD has no useful interpretation.23   
It is clear that my measure of PROMISE eligibility is imperfect.  Above the threshold, the 
discrepancy between estimated eligibility and actual receipt is attributable largely to the 
requirement that students have earned a 3.0 high school GPA within a set of “core courses.”  
Though I limit the sample to students with a 3.0 overall high school GPA, I do not observe the 
“core course” GPA, so not everyone above the threshold is truly eligible.  The ACT score itself 
may be imperfectly measured, so not everyone below the threshold is truly ineligible.24   
Moreover, it is implausible that much of the discrepancy between estimated eligibility 
and actual receipt could be driven by truly eligible students choosing to enroll in college but 
failing to take up the scholarship.  The program was introduced with great fanfare, highly 
publicized, and simple to understand, so lack of awareness is an unlikely explanation.25  Nor 
does claiming the scholarship require much paperwork, and even students who missed the 
deadline or only learned about PROMISE upon college enrollment could apply late and still 
                                                 
23 Note: in the case of perfect take-up among the truly eligible, the ITT effects equal the TOT effects. 
24 I have one set of scores per student, as reported by individual institutions from their college application data, but 
PROMISE eligibility is officially determined by scores obtained directly from the relevant testing agency.  If a 
student took the test more than once, this could introduce conflicts, as could reporting errors in the application data. 
For example, college applications often allow students to report results from more than one testing session, but the 
WVHEPC data only allow for one set of results.  In some cases the first or last score may be recorded rather than the 
highest score.   
25 Jack Toney, West Virginia’s Director of State Financial Aid Programs, indicated that it would be highly unlikely 
for a high school student to be unaware of the program, particularly if they were college-bound (personal 
communication).   
   12
receive funding in the spring term.26  For these reasons, I focus on the fuzzy RD results and 
interpret them as ITT estimates which have been corrected for misclassification of eligibility. 
 Results.  The results are shown in Table 1.  For context, column (1) shows mean 
outcomes for students just below the ACT threshold.  Confirming the graphical analysis, 
PROMISE receipt has no significant impact on persistence (semesters enrolled, over four years) 
nor on typical weekly school-year earnings for students near the ACT threshold.  Note that these 
are the two measures one might have expected to be most sensitive to reductions in college costs.  
Conditional on full-time enrollment, the direct marginal cost of taking additional courses is zero 
for most students with or without PROMISE.27  Yet the program appears to have substantial 
impacts on cumulative GPA and total credits earned in the first year as well as moderate impacts 
on these outcomes after four years: total credits increase by 2.1 after the first year (equivalent to 
one-half to two-thirds of a course) and 4.6 after four years, while cumulative GPA increases by 
0.16 after the first year (from a baseline of 2.52) and 0.10, or about one-tenth of a letter grade, 
after four years.28   
 The program also appears to have large effects on the percentage of students meeting key 
achievement thresholds.  PROMISE recipients were 9.5 percentage points more likely to have 
completed 120 credits after four years (four times the 30-credit annual requirement of PROMISE 
and generally a minimum requirement for a BA).29  They were also 9 percentage points more 
likely to have a 3.0 cumulative GPA.  Finally, PROMISE generates large and statistically 
                                                 
26 Eligible students must also submit the federal financial aid form (the FAFSA) and enroll full-time to claim 
PROMISE; however, the discrepancy between apparent PROMISE eligibility and actual receipt persists even if I 
limit the sample to FAFSA filers who enrolled full-time. It is particularly implausible that a truly eligible student 
would enroll full-time and take up federal student aid, while simultaneously declining PROMISE.  
27 In WV as in many other states, full-time students are charged a flat tuition rate so even outside of PROMISE, 
additional courses are free. 
28 Note that the GPA increases cannot readily be explained by grade inflation, as instructors at large public 
institutions are unlikely to know who within a given course is just above or just below the PROMISE threshold. 
29 Requirements are often higher, depending on the degree program. 
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significant impacts on BA completion.  Four-year BA completion rates rise by 9.4 percentage 
points from a baseline of just 16 percent (more than a 50 percent increase).  Five-year BA 
completion rises by 4.5 percentage points from a baseline of 37 percent (a 12 percent increase).  
The difference between the four- and five-year impacts suggests that PROMISE not only 
increases graduation rates, but also reduces time-to-degree.30   
The bottom of Table 1 also shows differences in covariates around the cutoff (using the 
same LLR specification, but with no controls), for which one hopes to see no significant 
discontinuities. There are no differences in percent female, age at entry, or average first-year Pell 
Grant.  Although those above the cutoff have statistically significantly higher high school GPAs, 
the difference is substantively very small, measuring only three hundredths of a GPA point, from 
a mean just below the cutoff of 3.46.  
Robustness checks.  Table 2 provides evidence that these results are highly robust to 
alternative specifications.  First, I test whether the results are robust to the inclusion of additional 
background controls: an indicator of whether the student graduated from a private high school 
(as well as an indicator for whether the high school type was unknown) and a set of 55 indicators 
for the student’s county of residence at entry.31  This has virtually no effect on the estimates. 
Next, I test whether the results are sensitive to the choice of bandwidth (i.e., the range of ACT 
scores included in the analysis).  As one might have predicted from the graphical analysis, the 
estimates fluctuate very little. Third, I test whether the results are sensitive to the choice of 
functional form.  In column (5) of Table 2, I estimate a two-stage model identical to (2a) and 
                                                 
30 Impacts beyond five years are not yet available.  In earlier cohorts prior to PROMISE, the vast majority of BA 
graduates (75 percent) completed their degree within five years; nonetheless, this still leaves the possibility that the 
graduation impact may attenuate further with a longer follow-up. 
31 These controls are not in the baseline specification for two reasons: first, almost as many students are missing 
information on high school type (1.6 percent of this sample) as attended a private high school (2.6 percent); second, 
controlling for county of residence at entry may unintentionally control for some effects of the program, if students 
move near their intended college prior to entry. 
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(2b) except for the addition of two quadratic terms for ACTdisti, one for each side of the 
threshold.  These local quadratic results indicate no systematic differences with the local linear 
specification, other than a noticeable increase in the standard errors.  Finally, I perform a 
falsification check in which I re-estimate the baseline (sharp) RD specification using students 
who entered prior to 2002.32  Since none of these students received PROMISE, the RD should 
estimate no effects for this group.  Column (6) of Table 2 shows the results; indeed, no impacts 
are found. 
Limitations.  Figure 4 shows the density of enrollments in the WV system by ACT score 
before and after PROMISE.  After PROMISE, there is a spike in the number of students with 
scores at or above the cutoff score.  A formal test of the continuity of the density function 
following McCrary (2008) indicates that the discontinuity is indeed significant, raising the 
possibility of differential selection.33  The consequences of differential selection will be 
estimated directly via a bounding exercise, after presenting the results from the cohort analysis.  
For the moment, I simply note that it is reassuring that there are no substantively significant 
discontinuities in observable characteristics around the threshold.34   
Identification Based on Timing of Program Implementation 
 For this analysis, I limit the sample to 12,911 enrollees meeting both the high school 
GPA and ACT score requirements for PROMISE who entered in the two cohorts just before 
(2000-01 and 2001-02) and just after (2002-03 and 2003-04) the program was implemented.   
                                                 
32 Since none of these students received PROMISE, it is impossible to estimate a fuzzy RD for this group. 
33 This test is implemented via local linear regression using the density (by ACT score bins) after PROMISE as the 
dependent variable and a bandwidth of 10.  The estimated jump in the density at ACT=21 is 3.4 percent (p=.002).  
Given that the density at ACT=21 is 15.5, this suggests that up to 3.4/(15.5-3.4)=28% of those just above the cutoff 
may be “marginal” students. 
34 A previous reader asked how it could be that there would be no noticeable differences in covariates in the 
presence of such a noticeable discontinuity in the density function. As will be discussed in the bounding exercise, 
even when there is significant selection into the program, the marginal enrollees still represent a minority of 
program beneficiaries (see footnote above), so differences in their covariates must be rather extreme to affect the 
cell means. 
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Graphical analysis . Simple plots of cohort means reveal discontinuous increases in 
college outcomes (a decrease in the case of school-year earnings) between 2001 and 2002, rather 
than steady increases over time, lessening the concern that before-after differences simply reflect 
broad underlying trends.  Similar plots of covariates (not shown), including average high school 
GPA and ACT scores, indicate no noticeable changes around the implementation of PROMISE. 
Estimation. A regression framework enables me to adjust the raw differences for any 
observable changes in sample composition.  The basic OLS specification estimates: 
(3) ittitit vXaftery εδβα ++++= )(  
where i indexes individuals, t indexes entry cohorts, aftert is an indicator variable equal to one 
for the 2002 and 2003 entry cohorts and zero for earlier cohorts, Xi is a vector of individual 
covariates including gender, race/ethnicity, high school GPA, high school GPA squared, and a 
set of indicator variables for each ACT score.35  Although treatment status generally varies at the 
individual level, once the sample is restricted to academically qualified individuals, the treatment 
varies only by year of entry.  For this reason I cluster the standard errors by cohort: vt is a cohort 
error term and itε  is an idiosyncratic error term. Doing so increases the standard errors for most, 
though not every outcome (see Appendix B, Table B.1, for details).  
Equation (3) estimates the effects of predicted PROMISE eligibility, not the effects of 
actual PROMISE receipt.  Because eligibility status is imperfectly measured (as discussed in the 
RD section above), only 86 percent of apparently eligible enrollees in the PROMISE cohorts 
actually receive PROMISE funds.  An IV specification can estimate the causal effect of actual 
                                                 
35 For the 10 percent taking the SAT instead, scores are first converted to ACT scores. Given the small number 
scoring 27 or higher, a single indicator variable is included for this group. 
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PROMISE receipt, using aftert as the plausibly exogenous instrument.36  I estimate the two-stage 
model: 
(4a) ittitit uXafterP ++++= ηφγλ )(  
(4b) ittiitit vXPy εδβα ++++= )ˆ(  
where Pit represents actual PROMISE receipt, itP̂  represents predicted PROMISE receipt based 
on the parameter estimates from (4a), and all other variables are as previously defined.  As was 
the case in the RD analysis, the IV results here can be interpreted as an intent-to-treat (ITT) 
estimates that have been corrected for misclassification of program eligibility status.  Because of 
misclassification, the OLS estimates are of less interest, but are again provided for comparison. 
Results.  Table 3 presents the estimates from equations (3) and (4), along with baseline 
means and raw differences for comparison.  For most outcomes, adding controls slightly 
increases the magnitude of the estimates (comparing the OLS results in column [3] to column 
[2]).  This suggests that at least along observable dimensions, eligible enrollees are a slightly less 
high-achieving group after the implementation of PROMISE.  The IV scales up the OLS 
estimates by a factor of 1.17 (i.e., 1.00/0.86).   
Receiving PROMISE appears to have only a small effect on total semesters of enrollment 
(a 0.15 increase, from a baseline of 6.7 semesters over four years) and little effect on GPA. But 
after the first year, recipients had earned 1.8 additional credits and 0.08 additional GPA points 
(both significant at the 1 percent level).  At the end of four years, the GPA effects dissipate but 
recipients had earned nearly 6 more credits on average (about a 6 percent increase) and earned 
about $10 per week less during the school year, slightly more than a 10% reduction.  As in the 
                                                 
36 Given that no students receive PROMISE prior to 2002, one could also include interactions of covariates and 
“after” in the first stage. This has little effect in practice, but prevents the clean interpretation of the IV as a simple 
scaling up of the OLS results, so for simplicity I omit these interactions. 
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RD, effects at key thresholds are larger than average effects.  The percentage of students who 
had earned at least 120 credits after four years rose by 11 percentage points (from a baseline of 
43 percent) and four-year BA completion rates increase by nearly 7 percentage points (from a 
baseline of just 27 percent).  Also as in the RD, some of the BA completion impact attenuates 
over time, leaving a marginally statistically significant impact of 3.7 percentage points after five 
years (from a baseline of 51 percent). 
Robustness checks.  I first test whether the cohort analysis is robust to controlling for 
students’ high school type (public or private) and 55 indicators for county of residence at entry.  
The results are presented in column (2) of Table 4, and are virtually identical to the baseline 
estimates in column (1). Next, I explicitly control for a linear time trend in order to focus on 
breaks from trend at the year of implementation.  This would be the preferred specification with 
a longer time series, but with only four cohorts it is more appropriate as a sensitivity test.  These 
estimates, presented in column (3), increase relative to the basic specification.   
I next test whether the findings from the cohort analysis are robust to the inclusion of 
comparison groups.  First, I estimate a difference-in-difference (DD) model in which I compare 
the changes among PROMISE-eligible enrollees to changes among out-of-state students enrolled 
in West Virginia who met the academic eligibility requirements but could not receive PROMISE 
due to their residency status.  Out-of-state enrollees comprise about one-quarter of the student 
body at West Virginia institutions.  This is not an ideal test, because the state’s largest university, 
WVU, substantially increased other scholarship opportunities for out-of-state students during the 
sample period in an explicit attempt to increase out-of-state enrollments.37  If these other 
                                                 
37 E-mail correspondence with Brenda Thompson, Asst. Vice President for Enrollment Management at WVU, June 
4, 2008.  The introduction of PROMISE did not directly coincide with any of these major new initiatives, which 
began in 2000.  
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scholarships attracted higher-quality out-of-state students over time, or had impacts of their own, 
this biases against finding positive impacts of PROMISE.   
I estimate the two-stage (IV) difference-in-difference equation: 
(5a) isttiststist XWVafterWVafterP εηφϕγψλ ++++++= )()()*(    
(5b) isttististist vXWVafterPy εδπςβα ++++++= )()()ˆ(  
where WVs is an indicator for whether the student was a West Virginia resident, Pist represents 
actual PROMISE receipt and istP̂  represents predicted PROMISE receipt based on the parameter 
estimates from (5a).  The IV estimates scale up the OLS estimates here by about 18 percent.38 
 Column (4) of Table 4 presents these DD estimates.  Virtually all of the point estimates 
shrink, and some lose significance as standard errors also increase.  But the differences in point 
estimates between columns (4) and (1) are almost all too small to be of any substantive 
importance (with school-year earnings being the exception).  However, if I add a linear time 
trend (not shown) the results are very similar to those in column (3), confirming that while non-
WV residents slightly increase in quality over time, there is no jump in their performance at the 
time of PROMISE implementation.   
 Finally, I perform a separate DD analysis in which I compare the changes for all students 
above the threshold to changes among all those below the threshold.  This test is also imperfect 
because students far below the threshold may not be a good comparison group for those far 
above it (indeed, this is the motivation for the RD analysis).  In any case, these estimates 
(presented in column [5] of Table 4) are generally similar to (and in several cases larger than) the 
basic estimates, indicating that the changes for those above the threshold are not mirrored by 
similar changes for ineligible students below the threshold.  
                                                 
38 Fewer than one percent of WV non-residents receive PROMISE.  This could occur if a West Virginia resident’s 
family moved out-of-state between the student’s high school graduation and college entry. 
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In contrast to other studies which have founded stronger effects of achievement 
incentives for women (for example, Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton 2009; Angrist, Lang, and 
Oreopoulos 2009), I find no systematic differences in the pattern of effects by gender (see 
appendix tables).  Estimates for additional outcomes for the full sample (such as major choice, 
for which there is no effect) can also be found in the appendix. 
Based on these robustness tests and the RD results, I conclude that the basic cohort 
analysis provides credible and perhaps even conservative estimates of the program’s impact.  
From this point forward, I will focus primarily on these results.   
Bounding the effects of selection bias 
It is fair to ask whether the results above could be biased by differential selection, given 
that an explicit goal of the program was to increase in-state enrollment among qualified 
students.39  Yet the potential for nonrandom selection need not make the evaluation problem 
intractable; Manski (1995), Lee (2009) and others suggest methods for bounding selection which 
influence the approach I take below.  To understand how selection may bias the findings 
presented above, recall the before-after model as specified in equation (3). The concern is that 
those who enter the sample as “eligible enrollees” after the implementation of PROMISE may be 
different from eligible enrollees who entered the sample in earlier cohorts.  Any differences 
captured by the covariates in Xi (including gender, race/ethnicity, age at entry, ACT score and 
high school GPA) can be controlled, but other differences may remain.  To control for these 
remaining differences, one would ideally like to include in all regressions an indicator of whether 
the student was induced by PROMISE to become an eligible enrollee, instead estimating: 
(6) itiitit ZXaftery ελδβα ~
~)(~~ ++++=  
                                                 
39 The question of whether PROMISE increased enrollments is important in itself.  It is not a main focus of my 
paper because of previous research on the topic, and my comparative data advantage for post-enrollment outcomes. 
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where Zi is equal to 1 if the student was induced to become an eligible enrollee because of 
PROMISE, and zero otherwise.40  The coefficient λ estimates how different these marginal 
enrollees are from intra-marginal enrollees, after controlling for other observable characteristics.   
 If at least some students are induced to become eligible enrollees because of the program, 
and these students are different in unobservable ways (λ>0), then the estimated β̂  from equation 
(6) will not converge to the true β~ .  If Xi were completely orthogonal to Zi (i.e. if none of the 
covariates were useful proxies for Zi) then: 
  (7) [ ] λββ ×==→− 1|)1Pr(~ˆ ti afterZ  
In words, equation (7) says that the size and magnitude of the bias will depend on two factors: 1) 
what fraction of eligible enrollees who are “marginal,” that is, induced to become eligible 
enrollees by PROMISE, and 2) how different marginal enrollees are from intra-marginal 
enrollees (as measured by the parameter λ).  This is an upper bound on the potential bias; it will 
be smaller to the extent that the covariates in Xi help proxy for the unobserved Zi.  In this section, 
I first estimate (1) using publicly available enrollment trend data, and then test the sensitivity of 
the main findings to varying assumptions about (2).   
 To estimate the impact of PROMISE on eligible enrollment, Figure 6 plots four different 
college enrollment rates for WV high school graduates: the percent enrolling in a public WV 
institution as a PROMISE-eligible student, the percent enrolling in a public WV institution as a 
PROMISE-ineligible student, the percent enrolling in a WV private institution, and the percent 
enrolling in an out-of-state institution.41  The figure indicates that the percent of WV high school 
                                                 
40 This analysis follows a framework used by Jonathan Guryan in the commentary section of Bettinger (2004).     
41 Trends in public WV enrollments come from the restricted-use individual-level WVHEPC data.  Trends in the 
number of high school graduates and aggregate data on private college enrollments were also obtained from 
WVHEPC.  The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) provides data on the home states of first-
time college freshmen by institution, but only in even-numbered years.  WVHEPC collects migration data annually, 
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graduates enrolling in public WV institutions as PROMISE-eligible students jumped by 4 to 5 
percentage points between 2001 and 2002, from a baseline of about 15 percent.42   This suggests 
that out of the 20 students eligible for the program in 2002 and later, 15 would have met the 
initial requirements and enrolled in a public WV institution with or without the scholarship, 
while 4 to 5 (20 to 25 percent) appear to be “marginal” enrollees.43 
Figure 6 also provides some information about where these marginal enrollees came 
from, and where they did not. Between 2001 and 2002, the out-of-state enrollment rate declined 
by 1.2 percentage points.  If one assumes that this entire decrease represents students switching 
to WV public institutions as eligible enrollees, then one-quarter to one-third of marginal 
enrollees were induced from out-of-state.  The percentage may be much lower if some of those 
induced from out-of-state decided to use their PROMISE scholarship at a WV private institution 
(private WV enrollment does tick upward in 2002).  These are the students most likely to create a 
positive bias, so it is reassuring that they cannot account for more than a third of the enrollment 
increase, or more than 6 percent (=1.2/20) of all PROMISE-eligible enrollees.   
It is impossible to identify in the data precisely who these 6 percent are, but one approach 
to bounding, following Lee (2009), is to make the extreme assumption that these marginal 
students represent the top 6 percent of values for a given outcome and then re-estimate the 
effects with these top values excluded.  But in the case where multiple, related outcomes are 
                                                                                                                                                             
but the data are based on surveys of high school administrators (who, according to WVHEPC, base their estimates 
largely on where students send ACT/SAT scores).  In even-numbered years, the IPEDS out-of-state enrollment 
numbers are consistently about 75 percent the level of the WVHEPC estimates.  I use the IPEDS statistics in even 
years and impute the out-of-state enrollments in odd years as 75 percent of the WVHEPC estimates for those years. 
42 The difference between just 2001 and 2002 is 3.7 percentage points, but including additional years increases the 
average before-after difference to about 5 percentage points.  Given that enrollment appears to be trending upwards 
even before 2002, the smaller figure may be more realistic, but I will use the larger figure to calculate upper bounds 
of the effect of compositional change. 
43 While this clearly limits the potential for compositional change, it is still a sizable enrollment effect.  This 
estimate is slightly higher than Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar (2006) find for Georgia HOPE, and comparable to 
Dynarski’s (2002) estimate for seven state programs.   
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available, Lee (2009) bounds, which were designed for the case of a single outcome, can be too 
conservative.  In the present case, it is empirically impossible for marginal students to 
simultaneously represent the top 6 percent of values for every outcome of interest.  For example, 
the top 6 percent of PROMISE recipients by cumulative college GPA had a five-year graduation 
rate of only 83 percent (not 100 percent), a four-year graduation rate of 68 percent (not 100 
percent), and accumulated an average of only 118 credits (which is just below the median, not 
the 94th percentile of credit accumulation).   
Thus, instead of throwing out the top 6 percent of values for each outcome individually, I 
re-estimate the effects for all outcomes after “trimming” the sample based on the 94th percentile 
of a key outcome, here either cumulative GPA (3.90 or above) or cumulative credits earned (149 
or above).  The results are shown in Table 5.  Column (1) restates the baseline estimates for 
comparison, and columns (2) and (3) provide the adjusted estimates after trimming the sample.  
Even under this rather extreme assumption, the coefficients shrink but generally remain above 
zero, and several key impacts retain significance, including the effects on first year outcomes, 
school-year earnings, meeting the 120 credit threshold, and earning a BA within 4 years.  
Interestingly, trimming based on outcomes over four years has virtually no effect on the 
estimated effect on first year credits, which is arguably the outcome most proximal to the policy 
(because most students were meeting the 2.75 GPA threshold even prior to PROMISE; and recall 
that 25% of recipients lost the scholarship after the first year).  Note that this analysis only 
examines the effects of positive selection; if one made similarly extreme assumptions about 
negatively-selected marginal students (those who otherwise would not have enrolled at all or 
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would have enrolled with an ACT score below the cutoff), the net effect of selection may way be 
a downward rather than upward bias.44   
 
IV. Inside the Black Box: Are Impacts Driven by Cost-of-College or Incentive Effects? 
Are Impacts Concentrated Around Annual Renewal Thresholds? 
 If PROMISE were a traditional grant with no strings attached, there would be no reason 
to expect the impacts on course credits or GPAs to be concentrated around the annual GPA and 
credit thresholds for renewal.  Yet this is precisely what is observed, at least in the case of course 
credits.  Figure 7 shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of credits attempted in each 
year of college, by entry cohort.  For the two pre-cohorts, the CDFs are basically smooth.  For 
the two PROMISE cohorts in the first three years of college, the CDFs shift to the right and a 
clear kink is visible just below the renewal threshold of 30 credits.45  The kink demonstrates the 
shift from below 30 to just above 30 credits.   
 Figure 8 presents CDFs for college GPAs.  GPAs are clearly higher for the PROMISE 
cohorts in the first three years.46  There are no clear kinks in the GPA distributions around the 
annual renewal thresholds, but the distributions appear slightly bowed with the largest before-
after differences found near the thresholds.  The absence of clear kinks is not surprising given 
that students cannot manipulate their GPAs as precisely as their course loads.   
                                                 
44 One can perform a similar analysis using the RD estimates, to arrive at a similar conclusion.  For the sake of 
brevity, I focus on bounding the cohort analysis estimates since they provide the more interesting policy parameter 
(average effects versus estimates local to the ACT threshold). 
45 The CDFs express the probability that the value of the outcome is less than or equal to X.  Thus, the kink in the 
CDFs of credits attempted at 29 credits indicates that the greatest impact is on the probability of completing 29 or 
fewer credits (or one minus the probability of completing 30 or more), which corresponds to the 30-credit renewal 
threshold. 
46 Indeed, if effects had been measured at the end of three years there would be a significant increase in cumulative 
GPAs of 0.06 points, using the cohort analysis specification. 
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Tellingly, these patterns disappear in the fourth (senior) year, when students still receive 
PROMISE funds but no longer face specific incentives regarding course load or GPA, because 
the scholarship cannot be renewed for a fifth year.  The distribution of credits remains slightly 
shifted to the right, but there is no longer a kink at the threshold.  The GPA distribution among 
PROMISE cohorts becomes virtually indistinguishable from that of the pre-cohorts, with the 
PROMISE cohorts perhaps even falling slightly behind.47  The change in pattern is not due to a 
dropoff in the number of PROMISE recipients: nearly 85 percent of those who received 
PROMISE in their third year also received it in their fourth.   
In Table 6, I quantify the differences shown in these figures.  I estimate impacts on the 
percentage meeting the renewal thresholds in each year, using the cohort analysis OLS 
specification as well as an IV approach to account for declining PROMISE receipt in each year 
of college.48  The results show that PROMISE recipients are 20 to 25 percentage points more 
likely to complete 30 or more credits in each of the first three years, but the impact is only 8 
percentage points in the fourth year.  Similarly, PROMISE recipients are 6 to 8 percentage points 
more likely to exceed the cumulative GPA thresholds in each of the first three years, but in the 
senior year the impact on (annual) GPA disappears completely. 
One alternative explanation is that students in the fourth year of college do not need to 
take 30 credits because they are closer than that to graduation.  This could account for some of 
the dropoff between junior and senior year impacts.  But even among students who received 
PROMISE for all four years, only 60 percent graduated in four years, and only one in five 
                                                 
47 I examine annual GPA rather than cumulative GPA in the fourth year because the cumulative GPA is mostly pre-
determined by actions in years 1-3. The annual GPA thus represents a cleaner test of students’ responses to the 
removal of the incentives.  A CDF of the fourth-year cumulative GPAs looks like a more muted version of the CDF 
of third-year cumulative GPAs.  
48 For the IV approach, “after” is used as an instrument for PROMISE receipt in the freshman, sophomore, junior, 
and senior years, respectively. 
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graduated in four years without taking at least 30 credits.  It thus seems unlikely that senior year 
course loads are much limited by the prospect of imminent graduation.  This explanation also 
cannot explain the falloff in fourth year grades.   
Are impacts limited to students with high financial need? 
Another way to test whether the effects are driven by income or incentive effects is to 
examine subgroups with differing levels of financial constraint.  The behavioral incentives of 
PROMISE should apply similarly to rich and poor students.  Richer students may, however, be 
less financially constrained and thus less sensitive to reductions in the cost of college.49  Because 
family income data are not available, I use a binary indicator of federal Pell Grant eligibility as a 
rough proxy for financial need.50  Both before and after the introduction of PROMISE, about 31 
percent of eligible enrollees received Pell Grants, which generally go to students with family 
incomes of $40,000 or less. 
Estimating the preferred specification (the basic cohort analysis IV) by Pell grant status, I 
find that the impacts are very similar between the two groups and if anything are somewhat 
smaller for Pell recipients for some outcomes (see Appendix Table B.6).  It should be noted that 
this comparison is not definitive: even Pell non-recipients could be financially constrained 
without PROMISE, and some Pell recipients may remain significantly constrained even with 
PROMISE.  Still, the finding that impacts are not concentrated among the neediest students is 
suggestive that cost-of-college effects are not the sole mechanism driving the results.  
Do programs of similar value but with different incentives generate different effects? 
                                                 
49 Note that the two primary sources of need-based aid for WV college students—Pell grants and WV Higher 
Education Grants—are generally unaffected by PROMISE receipt, so rich and poor students have equal amounts of 
funding staked on the achievement incentives (see Appendix A for relevant program rules). 
50 Pell Grant eligibility is not a perfect measure either. Although PROMISE does not directly affect Pell Grant 
eligibility, PROMISE requires students to apply for federal aid and thus may increase Pell Grant take-up.  It is 
reassuring that the rate of Pell receipt remains stable before and after the introduction of PROMISE (see Table 2).  
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 If large financial incentives for college achievement work primarily by lowering the cost 
of college rather than by increasing the rewards for student effort, then programs of similar value 
should have similar effects on enrollees even if the incentives are slightly different.  The Georgia 
HOPE program provides a particularly instructive comparison. Georgia’s HOPE scholarship was 
the early model for many subsequent state programs, including PROMISE.  The two programs 
are of similar monetary value (both cover tuition and fees), and both require students to maintain 
a 3.0 GPA while in college (although PROMISE allows a 2.75 GPA in the first year).  But in 
Georgia there are no minimum course load requirements for renewal; students need not even 
attend full-time.   
While PROMISE accelerates students’ course progression, HOPE apparently had the 
opposite effect.  Cornwell, Lee and Mustard (2005) find that HOPE recipients at Georgia’s 
flagship university were 9.3 percentage points less likely to complete a full-time course load in 
their freshman year.  Given the similar value of the scholarships, this is dramatically different 
from PROMISE’s 25 percentage point increase the in the proportion of students completing a 30-
credit course load in the first year.  The difference suggests that students respond strategically to 
each program’s incentives: Georgia’s rules encouraged students to reduce course loads in order 
to raise their GPAs; West Virginia’s 30-credit renewal requirement effectively eliminates this 
strategy for “gaming” the system.51 
While HOPE may have slowed time-to-degree, Dynarski (2008) estimates that it (along 
with a similar program in Arkansas) increased the eventual BA completion rate among enrollees 
by 3 to 5 percentage points, which is comparable to the 3.7 percentage point impact on five-year 
                                                 
51 The 30-credit requirement may also reduce another form of gaming that was a concern under Georgia HOPE: 
students might switch out of science and math courses in favor of more leniently-grading subjects.  Since many 
science courses are worth four credits instead of three, PROMISE does not provide a clear incentive to substitute out 
of science.  I find that PROMISE had no impact on the proportion of students choosing to major in science or math 
at entry. 
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graduation rates under PROMISE.  It is thus possible that specific achievement incentives matter 
more for how students complete college rather than whether they complete college.  These 
results are also consistent with several other findings from the literature: an evaluation of the 
Gates Millenium Scholars program, which provides large financial benefits but minimal 
academic requirements, finds limited effects on academic outcomes (DesJardins and McCall 
2008; note, because the recipient population was academically elite, effects may simply have 
been limited by outcome ceilings).  Similarly, Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008) find that 
alleviating financial constraints alone does little to reduce dropout rates at a small private college 
in Kentucky.  Finally, Garibaldi et al. (2007) find that on-time completion rates at one Italian 
institution rose after a policy was implemented to charge students more for enrolling beyond the 
expected completion time, although such a tuition increase obviously does nothing to alleviate 
financial constraints.  
 
VI. Discussion  
I find that PROMISE has a significant impact on many end-of-college outcomes, with 
particularly large impacts on time-to-degree.  Despite the potential for selection bias, a bounding 
exercise shows that the estimated impacts on several important outcomes would remain 
significantly above zero even in the presence of very extreme assumptions about marginal 
enrollees.  Overall, including the estimated effects on initial enrollment, PROMISE increased the 
overall BA attainment rate (BA completers as a proportion of all individuals in an age cohort) by 
1.8 to 2.3 percentage points depending on whether the five-year BA impact persists, which may 
seem modest in absolute terms, but comes on top of a baseline BA attainment rate in West 
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Virginia of just 21.5 percent.52, 53  A full cost-benefit analysis is premature as graduates have just 
begun to enter the labor market.  But even if the five-year BA completion impact fades out, 
PROMISE easily passes a social cost-benefit analysis under reasonable assumptions about the 
returns to completed schooling, with up to 25 percent of net social benefits due to the 
improvements in time-to-degree (see appendix for details of this analysis).  In simplistic terms, 
PROMISE cost about $63 million and produced about 1000 additional graduates over its first 
two cohorts, with approximately three-quarters of these graduates remaining in-state for at least 6 
months after graduating (longer follow-up data not yet available).   
 An analysis of the mechanisms behind PROMISE’s impact makes clear that incentives 
matter, and the details of incentive design can have big consequences.  PROMISE likely would 
not have had the same impact, particularly on time-to-degree, had it been designed as a 
traditional grant with no strings attached or different strings attached.  This study also exposes an 
important (if obvious) explanation for delayed graduation: many students simply are not taking 
enough course credits each semester, beginning in the freshman year.   
While the cost-of-college effects of PROMISE are insufficient to explain its impact, this 
hardly implies that the value of the award is irrelevant.  It is important to note that cost-of-
college effects of the scholarship may matter most for dimensions of behavior beyond those 
covered in the present analysis.  Although I focus primarily on effects among college enrollees, I 
also find evidence that PROMISE increased the percent of high school graduates who enroll in 
West Virginia in the first place.  The initial enrollment decision may be more sensitive to the 
                                                 
52 This assumes a stable high school graduation rate of 82 percent, a 4 percentage point impact on eligible 
enrollment among high school graduates, and a graduation impact of 3.7 percentage points among eligible enrollees.  
53 Baseline BA attainment rate is from ACS 2005, based on WV residents aged 25-34, corresponding to the age 
cohorts just prior to PROMISE.   
   29
cost-of-college effects of PROMISE.  The scholarship also reduced student loan debt (see 
appendix), which could affect post-graduation decisions (Field 2009; Rothstein and Rouse 2008).   
Of course, financial aid policy is not the only means of affecting collegiate attainment, 
and even with large incentives, many students still fail to graduate or fail to graduate on time.  
Still, the findings here suggest that incentives tied to minimum course loads (not just GPAs) may 
be one of several promising tools for increasing educational attainment and speeding time-to-
degree.  
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Table 1
RD Estimates of the Effect of West Virginia's PROMISE Scholarship
(1) Means (2) Sharp RD, LLR (3) Fuzzy RD, LLR
Among 16<=ACT<=25 16<=ACT<=25
Outcome ACT=20 B (SE) B (SE)
Received PROMISE 0.067 0.700 *** (0.012) 1.000 *** (0.000)
Value of PROMISE in Year 1 $172 $2,108 *** ($37) $3,012 *** ($21)
Total PROMISE received (over 4 years) $507 $5,835 *** ($158) $8,338 *** ($180)
GPA, end of year 1 2.523 0.109 *** (0.036) 0.156 *** (0.051)
Credits earned, end of year 1 24.529 1.466 *** (0.325) 2.095 *** (0.461)
Number of semesters enrolled (over 4 years) 6.354 0.026 0 (0.091) 0.037 0 (0.130)
Total credits earned (over 4 years) 86.345 3.250 * (1.769) 4.644 * (2.519)
Cumulative GPA (over 4 years) [a] 2.675 0.069 ** (0.031) 0.099 ** (0.045)
Typical weekly school-year earnings [b] $101.77 -$1.48 0 ($4.93) -$2.12 0 ($7.04)
Earned 120 credits by end of Year 4 0.310 0.067 *** (0.018) 0.095 *** (0.026)
Had 3.0+ cumulative GPA at end of Year 4 0.401 0.063 *** (0.019) 0.090 *** (0.027)
Earned BA within 4 Years 0.155 0.066 *** (0.015) 0.094 *** (0.022)
Earned BA within 5 Years 0.367 0.032 0 (0.019) 0.045 * (0.028)
Covariates
High school GPA 3.457 0.025 ** (0.011) 0.034 ** (0.015)
Percent female 0.626 -0.006 (0.020) -0.008 (0.028)
Age at entry (years) 18.6 -0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02)
Average Pell Grant (year of entry) $1,097 -$44 ($62) -$61 ($86)
Sample size 972 8,567 8,567
SOURCE: Author's calculations using WVHEPC administrative data on first-time degree-seeking 
freshmen aged 19 and younger who were West Virginia residents, entered in 2002-03 or 2003-04, and 
met the high school GPA requirement for PROMISE (3.0+).  
NOTES: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include indicator controls for gender, 
race/ethnicity, age, as well as a quadratic function of high school GPA.  "LLR" indicates a local linear 
specification is used.  Stars indicate the significance of individual findings at the p<0.10, p<0.05, or 
p<0.01 level.  [a] For students who drop out, cumulative GPA is imputed as the cumulative GPA when 
last enrolled. [b] I calculate average weekly earnings based on the four quarters of school year 
employment data that are available for all cohorts, corresponding to the spring of the second 
(sophomore) year, the spring and fall of the third year, and the fall of the fourth year following 
enrollment. 
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Table 2
RD Robustness Checks
(1) Baseline: Robustness Checks (6) Falsification
Fuzzy RD, LLR (2) Add controls for Alternate Bandwidths (5) Local Quadratic Exercise: Sharp RD
16<=ACT<=25 HSType/CountyFE (3) 18<=ACT<=23 (4) 11<=ACT<=30 Regression Before 2002
Outcome B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Received PROMISE 1.000 *** (0.000) 1.000 *** (0.000) 1.000 *** (0.000) 1.000 *** (0.000) 1.000 *** (0.000) n/a
Value of PROMISE in Year 1 $3,012 *** ($21) $3,004 *** ($20) $3,029 *** ($27) $2,979 *** ($16) $3,038 *** ($34) n/a
Total PROMISE received (over 4 years) $8,338 *** ($180) $8,293 *** ($180) $8,539 *** ($235) $8,211 *** ($139) $8,630 *** ($293) n/a
GPA, end of year 1 0.156 *** (0.051) 0.156 *** (0.051) 0.210 *** (0.064) 0.073 * (0.043) 0.221 *** (0.081) -0.033 0 (0.036)
Credits earned, end of year 1 2.095 *** (0.461) 2.121 *** (0.460) 2.609 *** (0.582) 1.455 *** (0.383) 2.751 *** (0.736) -0.359 0 (0.330)
Number of semesters enrolled (over 4 years 0.037 0 (0.130) 0.003 0 (0.130) 0.066 0 (0.165) -0.051 0 (0.108) 0.059 0 (0.208) -0.130 0 (0.094)
Total credits earned (over 4 years) 4.644 * (2.519) 4.331 * (2.518) 3.842 0 (3.251) 2.193 0 (2.069) 2.829 0 (4.085) -1.027 0 (1.799)
Cumulative GPA (over 4 years) [a] 0.099 ** (0.045) 0.091 ** (0.045) 0.105 * (0.057) 0.024 0 (0.038) 0.122 * (0.072) -0.008 0 (0.032)
Typical weekly school-year earnings [b] -$2.12 0 ($7.04) -$1.58 0 ($7.08) $4.16 0 ($9.01) -$0.58 0 ($5.91) $1.40 0 ($11.44) -$6.06 0 ($4.97)
Earned 120 credits by end of Year 4 0.095 *** (0.026) 0.093 *** (0.026) 0.087 ** (0.034) 0.109 *** (0.021) 0.072 * (0.043) -0.003 0 (0.019)
Had 3.0+ cumulative GPA at end of Year 4 0.090 *** (0.027) 0.084 *** (0.027) 0.080 ** (0.035) 0.082 *** (0.022) 0.090 ** (0.044) 0.023 0 (0.020)
Earned BA within 4 Years 0.094 *** (0.022) 0.094 *** (0.022) 0.100 *** (0.029) 0.078 *** (0.017) 0.096 *** (0.036) 0.011 0 (0.015)
Earned BA within 5 Years 0.045 * (0.028) 0.043 0 (0.028) 0.038 0 (0.036) 0.040 * (0.022) 0.048 0 (0.045) 0.000 0 (0.020)
Sample size 8,567 8,567 6,086 10,719 8,567 7,826
SOURCE: Author's calculations using WVHEPC administrative data on first-time degree-seeking freshmen aged 19 and younger who were West Virginia residents, entered in 
2002-03 or 2003-04, and met the high school GPA requirement for PROMISE (3.0+).  
NOTES: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include indicator controls for gender, race/ethnicity, age, as well as a quadratic function of high school GPA.  
Column (2) includes an indicator for private high school graduates and an indicator for those whose high school public/private status was missing, as well as a set of indicators 
for each WV county of residence.  Except where otherwise noted, regressions use a fuzzy RD, local linear regression for students with ACT scores of 16 to 25.  Stars indicate the 
significance of individual findings at the p<0.10, p<0.05, or p<0.01 level.  [a] For students who drop out, cumulative GPA is imputed as the cumulative GPA when last enrolled. 
[b] I calculate average weekly earnings based on the four quarters of school year employment data that are available for all cohorts, corresponding to the spring of the second 
(sophomore) year, the spring and fall of the third year, and the fall of the fourth year following enrollment. 
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Table 3
Cohort Analysis Estimates of the Effect of PROMISE
(1) (2) Before-After with Controls
Pre- After- (3) OLS (4) IV
Outcome Mean Before B (SE) B (SE)
Received PROMISE 0.000 0.852 0.859 *** (0.009) 1.000 *** (0.000)
Value of PROMISE in Year 1 $0 $2,621 $2,643 *** ($131) $3,077 *** ($120)
Total PROMISE received (over 4 years) $0 $8,598 $8,677 *** ($310) $10,101 *** ($255)
GPA, end of year 1 2.849 0.062 0.066 *** (0.005) 0.077 *** (0.006)
Credits earned, end of year 1 26.239 1.529 1.572 *** (0.085) 1.830 *** (0.118)
Number of semesters enrolled (over 4 years) 6.731 0.118 0.126 ** (0.037) 0.146 ** (0.045)
Total credits earned (over 4 years) 97.225 4.668 4.967 ** (0.940) 5.782 ** (1.136)
Cumulative GPA (over 4 years) [a] 2.982 0.025 0.033 0 (0.015) 0.039 0 (0.018)
Typical weekly school-year earnings [b] $85.51 -$7.40 -$8.20 ** ($1.76) -$9.55 ** ($2.10)
Earned 120 credits by end of Year 4 0.431 0.091 0.095 *** (0.015) 0.111 *** (0.018)
Had 3.0+ cumulative GPA at end of Year 4 0.590 0.025 0.030 * (0.010) 0.035 * (0.012)
Earned BA within 4 Years 0.267 0.054 0.058 *** (0.004) 0.067 *** (0.005)
Earned BA within 5 Years 0.509 0.029 0.031 * (0.010) 0.037 * (0.012)
Sample size 12,911 12,911
SOURCE: Author's calculations using WVHEPC administrative data on first-time degree-seeking freshmen 
aged 19 and younger, enrolling in the fall semester of school years 2000-01 through 2003-04.  The sample is 
restricted to West Virginia residents who met the high school GPA (3.0+) and ACT/SAT (21/1000+) score 
requirements for PROMISE eligibility.
NOTES: Robust standard errors, clustered by cohort, are in parentheses. All regressions include indicator 
controls for gender, race/ethnicity, age, high school GPA and GPA squared, and indictors for each ACT score. 
Stars indicate the significance of individual findings at the p<0.10, p<0.05, or p<0.01 level. [a] For students 
who drop out, cumulative GPA is imputed as the cumulative GPA when last enrolled. [b] I calculate average 
weekly earnings based on the four quarters of school year employment data that are available for all cohorts, 
corresponding to the spring of the second (sophomore) year, the spring and fall of the third year, and the fall of 
the fourth year following enrollment. 
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Table 4
Cohort Analysis Robustness Checks
(1) IV Before/After, (2) Add controls for (3) Linear Time IV Diff-in-diffs
All WV Eligibles HSType/CountyFE Trend (4) Out of state (5) Below threshold
Outcome B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Received PROMISE 1.000 *** (0.000) 1.000 *** (0.000) 1.000 *** (0.000) 1.000 *** (0.000) 1.000 *** (0.000)
Value of PROMISE in Year 1 $3,077 *** ($120) $3,076 *** ($119) $2,742 *** ($200) $3,076 *** ($120) $3,092 *** ($119)
Total PROMISE received (over 4 years) $10,101 *** ($255) $10,089 *** ($259) $9,381 *** ($403) $10,084 *** ($269) $10,156 *** ($268)
GPA, end of year 1 0.077 *** (0.006) 0.079 *** (0.005) 0.057 *** (0.002) 0.053 0 (0.026) 0.093 0 (0.049)
Credits earned, end of year 1 1.830 *** (0.118) 1.796 *** (0.107) 2.136 *** (0.186) 1.419 * (0.481) 1.786 *** (0.296)
Number of semesters enrolled (over 4 years) 0.146 ** (0.045) 0.138 ** (0.040) 0.296 *** (0.001) 0.102 0 (0.118) 0.301 *** (0.047)
Total credits earned (over 4 years) 5.782 ** (1.136) 5.544 ** (1.062) 9.511 *** (0.457) 4.045 0 (2.817) 9.460 *** (1.269)
Cumulative GPA (over 4 years) [a] 0.039 0 (0.018) 0.037 0 (0.017) 0.101 *** (0.014) 0.019 0 (0.037) 0.040 0 (0.043)
Typical weekly school-year earnings [b] -$9.55 ** ($2.10) -$9.51 ** ($2.08) -$15.48 *** ($2.13) -$4.47 * ($1.47) -$15.78 ** ($3.64)
Earned 120 credits by end of Year 4 0.111 *** (0.018) 0.108 *** (0.017) 0.158 *** (0.023) 0.088 ** (0.019) 0.119 *** (0.016)
Had 3.0+ cumulative GPA at end of Year 4 0.035 * (0.012) 0.034 * (0.011) 0.072 *** (0.009) 0.018 0 (0.013) 0.019 0 (0.022)
Earned BA within 4 Years 0.067 *** (0.005) 0.066 *** (0.005) 0.076 *** (0.008) 0.044 ** (0.014) 0.066 *** (0.002)
Earned BA within 5 Years 0.037 * (0.012) 0.034 * (0.012) 0.069 ** (0.017) 0.019 0 (0.028) 0.056 ** (0.013)
Sample size 12,911 12,911 12,911 16,645 20,849
SOURCE: Author's calculations using WVHEPC administrative data on first-time degree-seeking freshmen aged 19 and younger, enrolling in the fall semester 
of school years 2000-01 through 2003-04.  Unless otherwise noted, the sample is restricted to West Virginia residents who met the high school GPA (3.0+) 
and ACT/SAT (21/1000+) score requirements for PROMISE eligibility.
NOTES: Robust standard errors, clustered by cohort, are in parentheses. All regressions include indicator controls for gender, race/ethnicity, age, high school 
GPA and GPA squared, and indictors for each ACT score. Column (2) includes an indicator for private high school graduates and an indicator for those whose 
high school public/private status was missing, as well as a set of indicators for each WV county of residence. Stars indicate the significance of individual 
findings at the p<0.10, p<0.05, or p<0.01 level. [a] For students who drop out, cumulative GPA is imputed as the cumulative GPA when last enrolled. [b] I 
calculate average weekly earnings based on the four quarters of school year employment data that are available for all cohorts, corresponding to the spring of 
the second (sophomore) year, the spring and fall of the third year, and the fall of the fourth year following enrollment. 
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Table 5
Bounding Exercise
(1) IV Before/After, (2) Trim Top 6% (After) (3) Trim Top 6% (After)
All WV Eligibles Based on Cumulative GPA Based on Cum. Credits
Outcome B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Received PROMISE 1.000 *** (0.000) 1.000 *** (0.000) 1.000 *** (0.000)
Value of PROMISE in Year 1 $3,077 *** ($120) $3,076 *** ($120) $3,068 *** ($120)
Total PROMISE received (over 4 years) $10,101 *** ($255) $9,939 *** ($261) $9,848 *** ($257)
GPA, end of first year 0.077 *** (0.006) 0.038 ** (0.007) 0.054 *** (0.004)
Credits earned, end of first year 1.830 *** (0.118) 1.740 *** (0.111) 1.578 *** (0.114)
Number of semesters enrolled (over 4 years) 0.146 ** (0.045) 0.142 * (0.045) 0.087 0 (0.046)
Total credits earned (over 4 years) 5.782 ** (1.136) 5.540 ** (1.174) 2.108 0 (1.135)
Cumulative GPA (over 4 years) [a] 0.039 0 (0.018) -0.011 0 (0.016) 0.012 0 (0.020)
Typical weekly school-year earnings [b] -$9.55 ** ($2.10) -$8.66 ** ($2.23) -$7.52 ** ($2.16)
Earned 120 credits by end of Year 4 0.111 *** (0.018) 0.104 *** (0.018) 0.082 ** (0.018)
Had 3.0+ cumulative GPA at end of Year 4 0.035 * (0.012) 0.020 0 (0.012) 0.019 0 (0.013)
Earned BA within 4 Years 0.067 *** (0.005) 0.049 *** (0.005) 0.045 *** (0.005)
Earned BA within 5 Years 0.037 * (0.012) 0.024 0 (0.012) 0.012 0 (0.012)
Sample size 12,911 12,464 12,462
SOURCE: Author's calculations using WVHEPC administrative data on first-time degree-seeking freshmen aged 19 and younger, enrolling 
in the fall semester of school years 2000-01 through 2003-04.  Unless otherwise noted, the sample is restricted to West Virginia residents 
who met the high school GPA (3.0+) and ACT/SAT (21/1000+) score requirements for PROMISE eligibility.
NOTES: Robust standard errors, clustered by cohort, are in parentheses. All regressions include indicator controls for gender, race/ethnicity, 
age, high school GPA and GPA squared, and indictors for each ACT score. Column (2) includes an indicator for private high school 
graduates and an indicator for those whose high school public/private status was missing, as well as a set of indicators for each WV county 
of residence. Stars indicate the significance of individual findings at the p<0.10, p<0.05, or p<0.01 level. [a] For students who drop out, 
cumulative GPA is imputed as the cumulative GPA when last enrolled. [b] I calculate average weekly earnings based on the four quarters of 
school year employment data that are available for all cohorts, corresponding to the spring of the second (sophomore) year, the spring and 
fall of the third year, and the fall of the fourth year following enrollment. 
                 The proportion of the sample that is trimmed, 6 percent, is calculated based on an analysis of the enrollment shifts displayed in 
Figure 6.  I then identify the set of students in the "after" cohorts with the top 6 percent of values on either cumulative GPA (equivalent to a 
3.90 or above) after four years or cumulative credits earned after four years (149 credits or above), respectively, and reestimate the effects 
with these students excluded.
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Table 6
OLS and IV Cohort Analysis Estimates of the Effect of West Virginia's PROMISE Scholarship
on Selected Outcomes (Using "After" as Instrument for PROMISE Receipt in Each Year)
Pre- Basic OLS IV: Freshman Year IV: Soph. Year IV: Junior Year IV: Senior  Year
Outcome Mean B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Received PROMISE: Year 1 0.000 0.859 *** (0.009) 1.000 *** (0.000)
Year  2 0.000 0.652 *** (0.005) 1.000 *** (0.000)
Year  3 0.000 0.520 *** (0.001) 1.000 *** (0.000)
Year  4 0.000 0.440 *** (0.009) 1.000 *** (0.000)
Completed at least  30 credits in: Year 1 0.409 0.210 *** (0.003) 0.245 *** (0.004)
Year  2 0.383 0.139 *** (0.006) 0.213 *** (0.010)
Year  3 0.360 0.109 *** (0.007) 0.209 *** (0.013)
Year  4 0.296 0.035 * (0.012) 0.080 * (0.027)
Cumulative 2.75+ GPA, end of Year 1 (a) 0.678 0.051 *** (0.007) 0.059 *** (0.008)
Cumulative 3.0+ GPA, end of Year 2 0.572 0.050 *** (0.006) 0.077 *** (0.010)
Cumulative 3.0+ GPA, end of Year 3 0.578 0.044 ** (0.008) 0.084 ** (0.015)
Cumulative 3.0+ GPA, end of Year 4 0.590 0.030 * (0.010) 0.067 * (0.023)
Annual 2.75+ GPA, Year 1 (b) 0.633 0.044 *** (0.004) 0.052 *** (0.005)
Annual 3.0+ GPA, Year 2 0.537 0.049 * (0.018) 0.075 * (0.028)
Annual 3.0+ GPA, Year 3 0.562 0.032 ** (0.008) 0.061 ** (0.016)
Annual 3.0+ GPA, Year 4 (a) 0.599 -0.008 0 (0.009) -0.018 0 (0.021)
Sample size 12,911 12,911 12,911 12,911 12,911
SOURCE: Author's calculations using WVHEPC administrative data on first-time degree-seeking freshmen aged 19 and younger, enrolling in the fall semester of 
school years 2000-01 through 2003-04.  Unless otherwise noted, the sample is restr icted to West Virginia residents who met the high school GPA (3.0+) and ACT/SAT 
(21/1000+) score requirements for PROMISE eligibility.
NOTES: Robust standard errors, clustered by cohort, are in parentheses. All  regressions use the basic before-after specification and include controls for gender, 
race/ethnicity, age, high school GPA and ACT score (or equivalent).  (a) I present both cumulative and annual GPAs.  PROMISE renewal is contingent upon 
cumulative GPAs in the first  three years; but because the cumulative GPA in Year 4 is mostly determined by behavior prior to Year 4, it does not reveal behavioral 
changes as clearly as the annual GPA measure.  (b) In Year 1, the cumulative and annual GPA measures are not identical because of slight differences in how certain 
courses (such as transfer and/or remedial courses) are counted. For students not enrolled in a given year, annual GPA is first imputed as the semester GPA if the student 
enrolled for at least one semester, otherwise it  is imputed as the cumulative GPA as of last enrollment (71 percent of the sample enrolled for a t least  part of year 4; 68 
percent enrolled full-time for the full year ; 62 percent enrolled full-time for all four year s).
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SOURCE: Author’s calculations using WVHEPC data on West Virginia resident first-time freshmen 
entering two- or four-year public WV institutions in fall 2002 or fall 2003, who had at least a 3.0 high 
school GPA. 
NOTES: Each dot indicates the rate of PROMISE receipt for students with a given ACT score, with the 
size of the dots reflecting the distribution of students across ACT scores.  The line represents a linear 
prediction, allowed to vary on either side of the threshold, based on the cell-size weighted group means for 
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Figure 5 
Selected Outcomes By Cohort 
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SOURCE: Author's calculations using WVHEPC administrative data on first-time degree-
seeking West Virginia residents aged 19 and younger, who met the high school GPA (3.0+) and 
ACT/SAT (21/1000+) score requirements for PROMISE eligibility.
NOTES: Bars indicate unadjusted means by cohort.  Typical weekly earnings are based on the 
four quarters of school year employment data  that are available for all  cohorts, corresponding to 
the spring of the second (sophomore) year, the spring and fall of the third year, and the fall of 
the fourth year following enrollment. For students who drop out, cumulative GPA is imputed as 
the cumulative GPA when last enrolled. 
 
Figure 6 
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SOURCE: Author's calculations using the following data sources: HSGRADS - WV Department of 
Education, as reported in annual WVHEPC College Going Rate reports.  WVPUB - Author's calculations 
using WVHEPC administrative data on enrollments.  Includes first-time freshmen seeking a 2/4-yr degree 
who graduated from a WV high school in the past 12 months. WVPRI - Annual institutional survey 
conducted by WVHEPC, as reported in annual WVHEPC College Going Rate reports. Out of state - 
IPEDS Residence and Migration reports, and WVHEPC surveys of high school administrators as reported 
in annual College Going Rate reports. 
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SOURCE: Author's calculations using WVHEPC administrative data on 12,911 first-time freshmen age 19 and younger,
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SOURCE: Author's calculations using WVHEPC administrative data on 12,911 first-time freshmen age 19 and younger,
who met PROMISE eligibility requirements.
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Additional Information on WV PROMISE and the WVHEPC Database 
 
Additional details on PROMISE.  Students must have graduated from high school in 2002 
or later to qualify. No students were “grandfathered” into the program. College credits earned in 
high school do not count towards the annual renewal requirements.  Students may take courses 
over the summer in order to meet the GPA or credit requirements, but must do so at their own 
expense.  Enrollment must be continuous, and those who fail to meet renewal requirements once 
cannot later regain the scholarship. Beginning in 2004-05, initial eligibility requirements became 
increasingly stringent.  The state also created a “leave of absence” policy enabling students to 
take time off from college (or delay entry) without forfeiting their scholarship eligibility. This 
analysis focuses on the first two PROMISE cohorts (2002-03 and 2003-04), for whom the 
original requirements applied.  Table A.1 provides a list of West Virginia two- and four-year 
institutions at which the scholarship could be used (note: only public institutions are represented 
in the WVHPEC dataset). 
  To claim the scholarship, students must complete a one-page “Application for State 
Level Financial Aid Programs” which collects little more than students’ identifying information.  
No financial information is collected and no academic information is collected beyond the 
student’s high school and intended college.  Students also must file the Free Application for 
Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) in order to claim PROMISE.   
Students’ PROMISE awards are not reduced by other aid received.  PROMISE awards 
will generally not affect federal Pell eligibility, but may reduce eligibility for the state’s need-
based Higher Education Grant Program (HEGP) for students whose total “need” is already met. 
HEGP provides funds equaling up to 75 percent of stated tuition and fees for those who have 
unmet need remaining after accounting for PROMISE, Pell, and other scholarships.  Because 
HEGP awards cannot exceed the total cost of attendance after subtracting the federally-
determined EFC, PROMISE, Pell and other grants, some students may receive smaller HEGP 
awards as a result of PROMISE.  In practice, PROMISE reduces cumulative HEGP awards over 
four years of schooling by an average of just $313—a small fraction of the average $10,000 
value of PROMISE.  The reductions tend to be higher for students with less need; students 
receiving Pell Grants and PROMISE saw virtually no reductions in HEGP awards. 
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PROMISE is relatively selective compared to some other state merit aid programs, such 
as those introduced in Arkansas and Georgia in the early 1990s.  For example, Georgia’s HOPE 
scholarship is based only on achieving a 3.0 high school GPA, and Arkansas’ program requires 
only a 19 on the ACT in addition to a 2.5 high school GPA requirement (Dynarski 2002).  
Among large-scale merit-based aid programs, West Virginia’s 30-credit renewal requirement is 
also unusual.  Several programs require only a minimum college GPA (typically 3.0) and “full-
time” enrollment (equivalent to 24 credits per year) to renew; some have no minimum credit 
requirements.  I could identify only one other state program with a 30-credit-per-year renewal 
requirement (South Carolina’s LIFE scholarship).   
Table A.2 provides descriptive statistics on students who met the high school GPA and 
test score requirements before and after the introduction of PROMISE (hereafter, “eligible 
enrollees”).  For comparison, I also provide statistics for all young public college enrollees in 
West Virginia, including enrollees from out-of-state.  Eligible enrollees have significantly higher 
high school GPAs and test scores, and are more likely to enroll in a four-year college than the 
typical WV student.  Among eligible enrollees, those who enrolled after 2002 were more likely 
to take the SAT, had slightly lower test scores, and were slightly more likely to enroll in a four-
year college (particularly the state’s flagship, West Virginia University).54   
 Additional details on WVHEPC data.  Permission to utilize these data, stripped of all 
personal identifiers, was provided by WVHEPC under a restricted-use data agreement.  The 
original data are limited to 64,280 first-time freshmen in the entering cohorts of 2000-01 through 
2004-05.  Because of changes in eligibility requirements as well as insufficient follow-up, I 
exclude the 2004-05 cohort.  I further limit all analyses to young entrants (age 19 and under), 
who were the targets of PROMISE.  I exclude approximately 5 percent of young entrants who 
were missing a high school GPA or ACT/SAT score.  From the remaining 40,792 students, I 
select samples appropriate to each analysis.  Much of the analysis focuses on the 12,911 
enrollees who were West Virginia residents and who met the high school GPA and ACT/SAT 
requirements for PROMISE eligibility between 2000-01 and 2003-04. 
Before stripping the file of identifiers, WVHEPC matched the student records to 
quarterly employment data as reported to the state’s Employment Security agency.  The 
                                                 
54 Note that PROMISE generates incentives to take the SAT in addition to the ACT (some students may do better on 
the SAT) and eliminates the price difference between WVU and other WV public institutions. 
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employment data covers calendar years 2002 through 2006, and cover only West Virginia 
employment.  In theory, this is a non-trivial limitation given that West Virginia’s two largest 
universities are located within a few miles of state borders (West Virginia University in 
Morgantown borders Pennsylvania while Marshall University in Huntington borders both 
Kentucky and Ohio).  In practice, these earnings data appear quite comparable to students’ self-
reports on the FAFSA, which include earnings from any state: for the 2002 and 2003 entry 
cohorts during the first two full calendar years after college entry, total administratively-reported 
West Virginia earnings represented 88 to 94 percent of total self-reported earnings on the 
FAFSA (among those who filed a FAFSA).  The discrepancy may be even smaller during the 
school year, but this is impossible to test since earnings are only reported annually on the 
FAFSA.  [Since FAFSA data are only available beginning in 2002, and then are only available 
for those who apply for financial aid, I do not utilize FAFSA earnings in my main analysis.] 
Even if absolute earnings levels are somewhat underestimated, this will not compromise the 





Public and Private 2/4 Year Colleges in West Virginia
Institution Name City Type
Undergraduate 
Enrollment
West Virginia University Morgantown 4-year, Public 20590
Marshall University Huntington 4-year, Public 9723
Fairmont State University Fairmont 4-year, Public 4264
Shepherd University Shepherdstown 4-year, Public 3970
WVU at Parkersburg Parkersburg 4-year, Public 3884
West Virginia State University Institute 4-year, Public 3465
Concord University Athens 4-year, Public 2693
West Liberty State College West Liberty 4-year, Public 2260
Bluefield State College Bluefield 4-year, Public 1923
West Virginia University Institute of Tech. Montgomery 4-year, Public 1462
Glenville State College Glenville 4-year, Public 1381
West Virginia Northern Community Coll Wheeling 2-year, Public 2844
Pierpont State Community & Technical Coll Fairmont 2-year, Public 2809
Marshall Community & Technical Coll Huntington 2-year, Public 2579
Southern West Virginia Comm & Tech Coll Mount Gay 2-year, Public 2317
Blue Ridge Community & Technical Coll Martinsburg 2-year, Public 1953
New River Community & Technical Coll Beckley 2-year, Public 1861
WV State Community & Technical Coll Institute 2-year, Public 1717
Potomac State Coll of WVU Keyser 2-year, Public 1485
Eastern WV Community & Technical Coll Moorefield 2-year, Public 786
Community & Technical Coll at WVU Tech Montgomery 2-year, Public 678
Mountain State University Beckley 4-year, Private not-for-profit 3921
Wheeling Jesuit University Wheeling 4-year, Private not-for-profit 1203
West Virginia Wesleyan College Buckhannon 4-year, Private not-for-profit 1176
University of Charleston Charleston 4-year, Private not-for-profit 1074
Bethany College Bethany 4-year, Private not-for-profit 833
Davis & Elkins College Elkins 4-year, Private not-for-profit 636
Alderson Broaddus College Philippi 4-year, Private not-for-profit 623
Ohio Valley University Vienna 4-year, Private not-for-profit 527
Appalachian Bible College Mount Hope 4-year, Private not-for-profit 274
Salem International University Salem 4-year, Private for-profit 420
Huntington Junior College Huntington 2-year, Private for-profit 785
National Institute of Technology Cross Lanes 2-year, Private for-profit 315
West Virginia Junior College-Bridgeport Bridgeport 2-year, Private for-profit 214
West Virginia Junior College Morgantown 2-year, Private for-profit 152
West Virginia Junior College Charleston 2-year, Private for-profit 150
Mountain State College Parkersburg 2-year, Private for-profit 106
Valley College Beckley 2-year, Private for-profit 90
Valley College Martinsburg 2-year, Private for-profit 68
West Virginia Business College-Wheeling Wheeling 2-year, Private for-profit 62
Valley College Princeton 2-year, Private for-profit 19  






Descriptive Statistics for West Virginia Public College Enrollees
All degree-seeking enrollees, PROMISE-Eligible
age 19 and under, Enrollees
Outcome enrolling before PROMISE Before After diff.
Percent female 0.524 0.568 0.556 -0.012
Percent white, non-hispanic 0.927 0.972 0.967 -0.005
Age a t entry 18.577 18.531 18.534 0.002
High school GPA 3.133 3.640 3.639 0.000
Took the ACT 0.747 0.908 0.905 -0.003
Took the SAT 0.253 0.092 0.142 0.050 ***
ACT score (or equivalent) 20.634 24.234 24.193 -0.041 **
Entered a  4-Year institution [a] 0.789 0.880 0.892 0.012 **
Entered West Virginia Univ. [a] 0.340 0.379 0.409 0.030 ***
Entered as a full-time student [a] 0.981 0.989 0.996 0.007 ***
West Virginia r esident 0.721 1.000 1.000 0.000
Received any Pell Grant, First Yr. 0.325 0.310 0.315 0.005
Sample size 20,217 5,777 7,134
SOURCE: Author's calculations using WVHEPC administrative data on first-time degree-seeking 
freshmen aged 19 and younger, entering public WV two- and four-year colleges. "Before" cohorts are 
those entering in Fall 2000 and Fall 2001; "after" cohorts ar e those entering in Fall 2002 and Fall 2003. 
"PROMISE-eligible enrollees" ar e West Virginia resident students who met the high school GPA (3.0+) 
and ACT/SAT (21/1000+) score requirements for PROMISE eligibility.
NOTES: Stars indicate the significance of before-after differences at the p<0.10, p<0.05, or p<0.01 level. 
[a] These measures are likely endogenous to PROMISE receipt.
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APPENDIX B: Additional Analyses 
Table B.1
Unclustered and Clustered Standard Errors
Regression Discontinuity Cohort Analysis
(1) Robust SEs (2) Clustered-ACT (1) Robust SEs (2) Clustered-Year
Outcome B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Received PROMISE 1.000 *** (0.000) 1.000 *** (0.000) 1.000 *** (0.000) 1.000 *** (0.000)
Value of PROMISE in Year 1 $3,012 *** ($21) $3,012 *** ($10) $3,077 *** ($7) $3,077 *** ($120)
Total PROMISE received (over 4 years) $8,338 *** ($180) $8,338 *** ($87) $10,101 *** ($65) $10,101 *** ($255)
Number of semesters enrolled (over 4 years) 0.037 0 (0.130) 0.037 0 (0.044) 0.146 *** (0.041) 0.146 ** (0.045)
Total credits earned (over 4 years) 4.644 * (2.519) 4.644 *** (1.163) 5.782 *** (0.864) 5.782 ** (1.136)
Cumulative GPA (over 4 year s) [a] 0.099 ** (0.045) 0.099 *** (0.017) 0.039 *** (0.015) 0.039 0 (0.018)
Typical weekly school-year earnings [b] -$2.12 0 ($7.04) -$2.12 0 ($6.30) -$9.55 *** ($2.17) -$9.55 ** ($2.10)
Earned 120 credits by end of Year 4 0.095 *** (0.026) 0.095 *** (0.014) 0.111 *** (0.010) 0.111 *** (0.018)
Had 3.0+ cumulative GPA at end of Year 4 0.090 *** (0.027) 0.090 *** (0.008) 0.035 *** (0.009) 0.035 * (0.012)
Earned BA within 4 Years 0.094 *** (0.022) 0.094 *** (0.016) 0.067 *** (0.009) 0.067 *** (0.005)
Earned BA within 5 Years 0.045 * (0.028) 0.045 *** (0.013) 0.037 *** (0.010) 0.037 * (0.012)
Observations 8,567 8,567 12,911 12,911
SOURCE: Author's calculations using WVHEPC administrative data on first-time degree-seeking freshmen aged 19 and younger, enrolling 
in the fa ll semester  of school years 2000-01 through 2003-04.  The RD sample is further restricted to those with an ACT score between 16 
and 25. The cohort analysis sample is restricted to West Virginia r esidents who met the high school GPA (3.0+) and ACT/SAT (21/1000+) 
score requirements for PROMISE eligibility.
NOTES: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include indicator controls for gender, race/ethnicity, age, high school GPA 
and GPA squared. RD regressions also include local l inear controls for ACT score; cohort regressions include indictors for each ACT score.  
Cell mean r egressions are performed by residualizing both the outcome and the treatment (actual PROMISE receipt), then collapsing these 
residuals and running the regressions on cell means, weighted by cell  size.  Stars indicate the significance of individual findings at the 
p<0.10, p<0.05, or p<0.01 level. [a] For students who drop out, cumulative GPA is imputed as the cumulative GPA when last enrolled. [b] I 
calculate average weekly earnings based on the four quarters of school year employment data that are available for all cohorts, corresponding 




Comparing Cohort Analysis and RD Estimates
(1) IV Before/After (2) IV Before/After (3) IV Diff-in-Diff (4) Fuzzy RD
All WV Eligibles ACT=21 only ACT 20/21  16<=ACT<=25
Outcome B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Received PROMISE 1.000 *** (0.000) 1.000 *** (0.000) 1.000 *** (0.000) 1.000 *** (0.000)
Value of PROMISE in Year 1 $3,077 *** ($120) $2,987 *** ($134) $3,028 *** ($129) $3,012 *** ($21)
Total PROMISE received (over 4 years) $10,101 *** ($255) $8,666 *** ($307) $8,774 *** ($342) $8,338 *** ($180)
GPA, end of year 1 0.077 *** (0.006) 0.119 ** (0.025) 0.205 * (0.087) 0.156 *** (0.051)
Credits earned, end of year 1 1.830 *** (0.118) 2.512 *** (0.367) 2.497 * (0.938) 2.095 *** (0.461)
Number of semesters enrolled (over 4 years) 0.146 ** (0.045) 0.150 * (0.053) 0.097 * (0.033) 0.037 0 (0.130)
Total credits earned (over 4 years) 5.782 ** (1.136) 4.192 *** (0.596) 3.734 0 (2.189) 4.644 * (2.519)
Cumulative GPA (over 4 years) [a] 0.039 0 (0.018) 0.059 0 (0.027) 0.089 0 (0.076) 0.099 ** (0.045)
Typical weekly school-year earnings [b] -$9.55 ** ($2.10) $1.79 0 ($1.77) $5.01 0 ($5.28) -$2.12 0 ($7.04)
Earned 120 credits by end of Year 4 0.111 *** (0.018) 0.096 ** (0.027) 0.093 *** (0.013) 0.095 *** (0.026)
Had 3.0+ cumulative GPA at end of Year 4 0.035 * (0.012) 0.038 *** (0.002) 0.044 0 (0.022) 0.090 *** (0.027)
Earned BA within 4 Years 0.067 *** (0.005) 0.081 ** (0.016) 0.091 *** (0.002) 0.094 *** (0.022)
Earned BA within 5 Years 0.037 * (0.012) 0.033 * (0.013) 0.063 * (0.022) 0.045 * (0.028)
Sample size 12,911 2,364 4,398 8,567
SOURCE: Author's calculations using WVHEPC administrative data on first-time degree-seeking freshmen aged 19 and younger, 
enrolling in the fall semester of school years 2000-01 through 2003-04.  Unless otherwise noted, the sample is restricted to West 
Virginia residents who met the high school GPA (3.0+) and ACT/SAT (21/1000+) score requirements for PROMISE eligibility.
NOTES: Robust standard errors (clustered by year, except for RD) are in parentheses. Before/after regressions include indicator 
controls for gender, race/ethnicity, age, high school GPA and GPA squared, and indictors for each ACT score.  Column (2) estimates 
the IV before/after only for students with an ACT score of 21.  Column (3) limits the sample to those with an ACT score of 20 or 21 and 
uses after*(ACT=21) as the instrument for PROMISE receipt.  The RD regressions include the same covariates but control for a local 
linear function of ACT scores.  Stars indicate the significance of individual findings at the p<0.10, p<0.05, or p<0.01 level.   [a] For 
students who drop out, cumulative GPA is imputed as the cumulative GPA when last enrolled. [b] I calculate average weekly earnings 
based on the four quarters of school year employment data that are available for all cohorts, corresponding to the spring of the second 





Cohort Analysis for Key Outcomes by Gender
Women Men
(1) Pre- (2) IV Before/After (3) Pre- (4) IV Before/After
Outcome Mean B (SE) Mean B (SE)
Received PROMISE 0.000 1.000 *** (0.000) 0.000 1.000 *** (0.000)
Value of PROMISE in Year 1 $0 $3,044 *** ($114) $0 $3,121 *** ($124)
Total PROMISE received (over 4 years) $0 $10,353 *** ($247) $0 $9,766 *** ($271)
Number of semesters enrolled (over 4 years) 6.704 0.175 ** (0.042) 6.766 0.105 0 (0.061)
Total credits earned (over 4 years) 98.853 5.355 ** (1.386) 95.084 6.297 *** (0.815)
Cumulative GPA (over 4 year s) [a] 3.085 0.021 0 (0.028) 2.847 0.063 *** (0.005)
Typical weekly school-year earnings [b] $88.58 -$10.02 *** ($1.30) $81.48 -$9.04 * ($3.03)
Earned 120 credits by end of Year 4 0.464 0.106 ** (0.025) 0.388 0.117 *** (0.008)
Had 3.0+ cumulative GPA at end of Year 4 0.653 0.033 0 (0.016) 0.506 0.037 ** (0.007)
Earned BA within 4 Years 0.304 0.067 *** (0.007) 0.218 0.068 *** (0.002)
Earned BA within 5 Years 0.535 0.031 0 (0.014) 0.475 0.044 ** (0.014)
Sample size 7,248 5,663
SOURCE: Author's calculations using WVHEPC administrat ive data on first-time degree-seeking freshmen 
aged 19 and younger, enroll ing in the fall semester of school years 2000-01 through 2003-04.  The sample is 
restricted to West Virginia residents who met the high school GPA (3.0+) and ACT/SAT (21/1000+) score 
requirements for PROMISE eligibility.
NOTES: Robust standard errors, clustered by cohort, in parentheses. All regressions include indicator  
controls for race/ethnicity, age, high school GPA and GPA squared, and indictors for each ACT score.  Stars 
indicate the significance of individual findings at the p<0.10, p<0.05, or p<0.01 level. [a] For students who 
drop out, cumulative GPA is imputed as the cumulative GPA when last enrolled. [b] I calculate average 
weekly earnings based on the four quar ters of school year employment data that are available for all cohorts, 
corresponding to the spring of the second (sophomore) year, the spring and fall of the third year, and the fall 






RD and Cohort Analysis Estimates of PROMISE Impact on Additional Outcomes
(1) Means, (2) Fuzzy RD (3) Pre-means, (4) Cohort Analysis
Outcome ACT=20 B (SE) all eligibles B (SE)
Entered a four-year college 0.771 0.016 0 (0.024) 0.880 0.017 ** (0.004)
Entered West Virginia University 0.238 0.057 ** (0.025) 0.379 0.041 * (0.013)
Entered Marshall University 0.215 -0.028 0 (0.024) 0.238 -0.005 0 (0.003)
Entered another two/four year college 0.547 -0.029 0 (0.029) 0.383 -0.036 ** (0.011)
Enrolled full-time, full year in first year 0.899 0.036 ** (0.016) 0.932 0.024 *** (0.001)
Continuously enrolled FTFY, two years 0.735 0.021 0 (0.025) 0.793 0.040 *** (0.006)
Continuously enrolled FTFY, three years 0.611 0.015 0 (0.028) 0.693 0.042 ** (0.012)
Continuously enrolled FTFY, four years 0.502 0.032 0 (0.029) 0.603 0.039 ** (0.011)
Annual GPA in first year [a] 2.523 0.156 *** (0.051) 2.849 0.077 *** (0.006)
Annual GPA in second year 2.498 0.079 0 (0.056) 2.796 0.088 * (0.033)
Annual GPA in third year 2.537 0.083 0 (0.056) 2.846 0.045 0 (0.020)
Annual GPA in fourth year 2.624 0.056 0 (0.057) 2.923 -0.018 0 (0.022)
Credits earned in first year 24.529 2.095 *** (0.461) 26.239 1.830 *** (0.118)
Credits earned in second year 21.111 0.688 0 (0.668) 23.384 1.409 ** (0.333)
Credits earned in third year 18.631 0.790 0 (0.746) 21.654 1.070 * (0.351)
Credits earned in fourth year 17.190 0.298 0 (0.781) 19.890 0.465 0 (0.384)
Summer credits (over three summers) 3.035 0.927 *** (0.284) 3.457 0.805 *** (0.058)
Earned BA within 4 Years 0.155 0.094 *** (0.022) 0.267 0.067 *** (0.005)
Earned BA by summer after 4th year 0.177 0.092 *** (0.023) 0.288 0.077 *** (0.005)
Earned BA by fall of 5th year 0.253 0.076 *** (0.025) 0.378 0.063 *** (0.007)
Earned BA within 5 years 0.367 0.045 * (0.028) 0.509 0.037 * (0.012)
Earned AA within 2 years 0.019 0.016 * (0.009) 0.024 -0.002 0 (0.002)
Earned AA within 5 years 0.119 -0.023 0 (0.018) 0.086 -0.013 * (0.005)
Entered as a math/science major 0.082 -0.003 0 (0.017) 0.236 -0.013 0 (0.008)
Earned a BA in math/science w/in 4 years 0.011 0.012 0 (0.007) 0.057 0.013 *** (0.001)
Earned a BA in math/science w/in 5 years 0.035 0.001 0 (0.011) 0.108 0.008 * (0.003)
Earned BA w/in 4 years, and was employed
or enrolled in WV in next fall [b] 0.121 0.076 *** (0.020) 0.208 0.041 *** (0.005)
Federal student loans, first year (2007$) $1,132 -$425 *** ($89) $1,072 -$298 ** ($70)
Cumulative federal student loans (2007$) $5,968 -$972 ** ($407) $6,007 -$780 ** ($175)
Sample size 972 8,567 5,777 12,911
SOURCE: Author's calculations using WVHEPC administrative data on first-time degree-seeking West Virginia resident 
freshmen aged 19 and younger, enrolling in the fall semester of school years 2000-01 through 2003-04, who had a high 
school GPA of at least 3.0.  The RD sample is further restricted to 2002 and 2003 entrants who had an ACT between 16 
and 25. The cohort analysis is restricted to entrants who had at least a 21 on the ACT.
NOTES: Robust standard errors, clustered by cohort, in parentheses. All regressions include indicator controls for gender, 
race/ethnicity, age, high school GPA and GPA squared, and indictors for each ACT score. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. Stars indicate the significance of individual findings at the p<0.10, p<0.05, or p<0.01 level. [a] For students 
who drop out, annual GPA is imputed as the cumulative GPA when last enrolled. [b] Data are not yet available for 





Time Series Results for Key Outcomes by Pell Grant Status
Pell Grant Recipients Non-Recipients
(1) Pre- (2) Time Series IV (3) Pre- (4) Time Series IV
Outcome Mean B (SE) Mean B (SE)
Received PROMISE 0.000 1.000 *** (0.000) 0.000 1.000 *** (0.000)
Value of PROMISE in Year 1 $0 $2,992 *** ($124) $0 $3,116 *** ($119)
Total PROMISE received (over 4 years) $0 $9,022 *** ($279) $0 $10,593 *** ($252)
Number of semesters enrolled (over 4 years) 6.449 0.068 0 (0.035) 6.857 0.187 ** (0.048)
Total credits earned (over 4 years) 90.3 4.435 *** (0.584) 100.3 6.491 ** (1.228)
Cumulative GPA (over 4 year s) [a] 2.893 0.005 0 (0.016) 3.023 0.056 * (0.023)
Typical weekly school-year earnings [b] $90.97 -$7.68 *** ($1.02) $83.06 -$10.52 ** ($2.70)
Earned 120 credits by end of Year 4 0.363 0.094 ** (0.017) 0.461 0.119 *** (0.016)
Had 3.0+ cumulative GPA at end of Year 4 0.551 0.016 0 (0.012) 0.607 0.044 ** (0.012)
Earned BA within 4 Years 0.217 0.061 ** (0.012) 0.290 0.070 *** (0.004)
Earned BA within 5 Years 0.443 0.008 0 (0.018) 0.539 0.051 ** (0.015)
Sample size 4,038 8,873
SOURCE: Author's calculations using WVHEPC administrat ive data on first-time degree-seeking freshmen 
aged 19 and younger, enroll ing in the fall semester of school years 2000-01 through 2003-04.  The sample is 
restricted to West Virginia residents who met the high school GPA (3.0+) and ACT/SAT (21/1000+) score 
requirements for PROMISE eligibility.
NOTES: About 31% of PROMISE-eligible students receive Pell Grants; the ra te is stable before and after 
PROMISE implementation (see Table 2). Robust standard errors, clustered by cohort, in parentheses. All 
regressions include indicator controls for gender, race/ethnicity, age, high school GPA and GPA squared, 
and indictors for each ACT score.  Stars indicate the significance of individual findings at the p<0.10, 
p<0.05, or p<0.01 level. [a] For students who drop out, cumulative GPA is imputed as the cumulative GPA 
when last enrolled. [b] I calculate average weekly earnings based on the four quar ters of school year 
employment data that are available for all cohorts, corresponding to the spring of the second (sophomore) 






APPENDIX C: Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
This cost-benefit analysis follows the general approach of Dynarski (2008), who 
evaluates PROMISE-like programs in Georgia and Arkansas.  I assume an enrollment impact of 
4 percentage points among high school graduates (this is based on the analysis of enrollment 
trends at the end of Section IV, and attributes one percentage point of the 5 percentage point 
increase in eligible enrollment to students who would otherwise have enrolled out of state).  I 
also assume that PROMISE did not affect the high school graduation rate. This is plausible for 
the first PROMISE cohorts, who were already at least halfway through high school when 
PROMISE funding was announced.   
Direct costs. Using WVHEPC administrative data on PROMISE recipients, and inflating 
amounts to 2007 dollars, I calculate that the direct scholarship costs were approximately $67 
million for the cohorts entering college in 2002 and 2003.  Using data on the number of high 
school graduates from the WV Dept. of Education along with an estimated 82 percent WV high 
school graduation rate from the American Community Survey (ACS) 2005, I estimate that there 
are 43,663 total individuals in the two corresponding age cohorts (i.e. all potential recipients of 
the program).  This generates an average direct cost of $1,548 per potential recipient.   
Additional state subsidy costs.  The cost to the state of providing a year of college is 
generally much more than tuition and fees.  I assume that tuition and fees cover 30 percent of 
total resource costs (this follows Dynarski, and is based on estimates from Winston [1999]).  In 
2007 dollars, average annual tuition/fees for students in the first two PROMISE cohorts was 
approximately $3,900, implying subsidy costs of $9,100 (=3900/0.30 - 3900) per student per 
year.  Given that the typical eligible student enrolled for 3.75 years (after five years of follow 
up), this implies 0.12 years of schooling induced by the program per potential recipient 
(=0.82*0.04*3.75).  This generates additional costs of $1,092 per potential recipient. 
Foregone wages.  Individuals induced to enroll by PROMISE spend less time in the labor 
market.  I assume foregone wages of $18,000 per year for non-college graduates (this is a 
generous estimate, based on first-year estimated earnings for WV residents who attain some 
college but less than an Associate’s Degree [WV Higher Education Report Card 2007]).  This 
opportunity cost is reduced, however, by student employment.  Using the WVHEPC data, I 
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estimate that eligible enrollees earn about $4,000 per calendar year while enrolled.  Therefore, 
opportunity costs add an additional $1,680 per potential recipient (=14000*.12). 
Deadweight loss of taxation.  Following Dynarski, I assume a deadweight loss of taxation 
equal to 0.245 times the direct scholarship costs and indirect subsidy costs of PROMISE.  This 
adds $645 per person to the cost of the program, for a total cost of $4,960 per person.   
Time-to-degree benefits.  If the five-year BA completion attenuates completely, this 
implies that 10.4 percent of PROMISE recipients graduate one year early (6.7 in four instead of 
five, plus 3.7 in five instead of six).  Assuming first-year graduate earnings of $27,000 (estimate 
based on WV administrative data, reported in WVHEPC 2007 Education Report Card), a real 
return to experience of 5 percent over the first 10 years (this is consistent with Census figures of 
earnings for 18 to 24 year olds versus 25 to 34 year olds with the same education level), a real 
discount rate of 4 percent, and student earnings of $4,000, the net present value of graduating 
one year early is $36,500.  [It is not clear whether finishing early reduces the resource costs of 
obtaining the degree, so I make the conservative assumption that it does not.]  This generates 
benefits of $607 per potential recipient (=36500*0.82*0.195*0.104). If the five-year BA effect 
persists, time-to-degree benefits would be $391. 
Benefits from increased BA attainment. If the five-year graduation rate impact among 
enrollees persists, PROMISE increased the overall BA attainment rate (BA completers as a 
proportion of all individuals in an age cohort) by 2.3 percentage points. This calculation uses an 
estimated 4 percentage point impact on eligible enrollment among high school graduates (from a 
baseline rate of 15.5 percent) and a graduation impact of 3.7 percentage points among eligible 
enrollees (from a baseline rate of 50.9 percent): 2.3=.82*.195*.546 - .82*.155*.509. Even if the 
graduation rate impact does not persist, the enrollment impact would still raise the BA attainment 
rate by 1.8 percentage points.   
Barrow and Rouse (2005) estimate that college graduates earn $440,000 more in present 
value than high school graduates (I have inflated their figure to 2007 dollars).  However, some of 
this difference may be due to underlying ability rather than the causal effect of education.  
Causal estimates of the return to a year of schooling fall between 9 and 15 percent for recent 
cohorts (see Dynarski 2008 for a review).  Using a middling estimate of 12 percent, and 
assuming that a BA is worth four years of schooling, and expected lifetime earnings for high 
school graduates are about $477,000 (Dynarski 2008; I inflate her estimate from 2002 to 2007 
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dollars), then the causal earnings gain from a BA is about $274,000.  Depending on whether or 
not the graduation rate impact persists, this generates benefits worth $4,925 to $6,293 per person.   
Benefits from increased “some college” attainment. In addition to benefits from increased 
BA attainment, PROMISE increases the proportion of the population with some college but less 
than a BA.  If the graduation rate impact persists, the increase in this category is 1.0 percentage 
point for the entire age cohort (=0.82*0.195*0.454-0.82*0.155*0.491; note: among eligible 
enrollees, PROMISE did not affect the proportion earning an AA).  If the graduation rate impact 
does not persist, this implies a larger increase in the percentage of students with some college of 
about 1.5 percentage points.  If some college but no degree is worth two years of schooling, this 
adds benefits of $1,200 to $1,800 per person (=0.01*$121,000).   
Summary.  Total social costs of PROMISE are estimated to be $4,960 per person while 
total social benefits are at least $7,352 per person even if the five-year graduation impact 
eventually fades out completely.  Under these assumptions, the program easily passes a cost-
benefit test, generating net benefits of $2,392 per potential recipient (a 48 percent net return on 
investment).  Even if the five-year graduation impact fades out and returns to schooling are lower 
than estimated, the program would break even in social welfare terms as long as the return to a 
year of schooling is about 8 percent.   
The above analysis treats scholarships paid to students whose enrollment was not affected 
as a cost.  Based on my analysis in Section IV, I estimate that approximately 75 percent of the 
direct scholarship costs are paid to intramarginal enrollees.  If these payments are considered as a 
transfer rather than a cost, the estimated social cost of the program falls to $3,800, net social 
benefits rise to at least $3,548, and the break-even rate of return to schooling is about 6 percent. 
Additional factors which are difficult to estimate, but likely add to the social benefits, 
include any lifetime earnings gain to higher cumulative GPAs at graduation, any health 
improvements due to the increase in educational attainment, and any economic externalities to 
increasing the skills of the labor force.   
 
 
